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INTRODUCTION 
Just as the world community had almost given up hope for 
a timely solution to climate change, new events have created 
reason for cautious optimism that an effective solution may, 
after all, be found at the supranational scale. In 2012, the 195 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) agreed that a legal instrument 
with binding force is to be adopted by 2015 and implemented by 
2020.1 In President Barack Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan, 
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1.  See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban, S. 
Afr., Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1; see also Durban: Towards Full Implementation of the UN Climate 
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the President finally promised that the United States will take 
international action and lead global climate change efforts.2 In 
the spring and summer of 2013, the United States and China—
arguably the two most important parties to a potential 
supranational climate change solution—reignited their mutual 
climate discussions and reached an important bilateral 
agreement to jointly phase down hydroflourocarbons (“HFCs”), 
one of the most impactful gases in climate change. This and 
other related rhetoric is indicative of the two nations’ potential 
willingness to accede to an internationally binding climate 
change agreement, which in turn may cause a watershed in 
negotiations and spur further action. 
This would be in the nick of time. Science demonstrating 
the onset of climate change is increasingly grim: global 
temperatures reached their highest levels in the history of 
modern records during the 2001–2010 time period and 
continue to rise.3 The decade included a more than 2000% 
increase in the loss of human life from heat waves,4 not to 
mention the threatened loss of animal species. New facts about 
the diverse problems of climate change continue to surface. In 
August 2013, for example, the journal Science reported that shifts 
in climate are strongly linked to human violence around the 
world, such as spikes in domestic violence in India and Australia, 
increased assaults and murders in the United States, ethnic 
violence in Europe, land invasions in Brazil, police violence in 
Holland, and civil conflicts throughout the tropics.5 The Fifth 
Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
                                                                                                               
Change Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONV. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
key_steps/durban_outcomes/iatems/6825.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
2.  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 17–
21 (2013) [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTION PLAN], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf. 
3.  WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 2001–2010: A DECADE 
OF CLIMATE EXTREMES 3 (2013), available at http://library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/
wmo_1119_en.pdf. 
4.  Andrea Vittorio, Last Decade Sees ‘Unprecedented’ Extremes, Highest Temperatures 
on Record, U.N. Says, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 1008 (July 3, 2013). For 
example, the 2003 heat wave in Europe caused more than 66,000 deaths and the 2010 
one in Russia more than 55,000. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., supra note 3, at 7–8. 
5.  Kathleen Maclay, Warmer Climate Strongly Affects Human Conflict and Violence 
Worldwide, Says Study, BERKELEY NEWS CTR. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://
newscenter.berkeley.edu/2013/08/01/climate-strongly-affects-human-conflict-and-
violence-worldwide-says-study/. 
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Change (“IPCC”) recently concluded that it is “extremely likely” 
(i.e., at 95%–100% certainty) that human activity is the principal 
cause of climate change. Thus, there can no longer be 
reasonable discussions about whether or not this problem is 
man-made and, accordingly, about whether or not human 
action is necessary to solve the problem.6 
According to the International Energy Agency, carbon 
dioxide (“CO2”) levels must be held to 450 parts per million 
(“ppm”) in this century in order for us to have a chance to keep 
global warming to the internationally agreed-upon goal of a 
temperature increase of no more than 2°C.7 But in 2013, CO2 
levels exceeded 400 ppm for the first time in human history,8 
demonstrating the uphill and urgent battle to be fought on this 
front. By putting climate change efforts on hold because of the 
recent global financial crisis and a lack of political will to agree 
on effective climate change goals, nations have managed to put 
the world on track towards a 5.3°C temperature increase with 
recognized and “potentially disastrous implications in terms of 
extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and huge [related] 
economic and social costs.”9 In fact, global temperatures have 
already risen 0.85°C since 1880.10 
Because the best predictor of future behavior is often past 
behavior, it is doubtful that a large number of nations with 
widely divergent interests in the climate context, such as all or 
                                                                                                               
6.  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I Contribution 
to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, 
Approved Summary for Policymakers SPM-12 (2013) [hereinafter IPCC, Climate 
Change], available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5-
SPM_Approved27Sep2013.pdf. “Extremely likely” denotes a 95-100% level of certainty. 
Id. at SPM-2 n.2. 
7.  See Rick Mitchell, IEA Urges Policy Action on Global Warming, Worries U.S. Shift to 
Natural Gas May Slow, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 844 (June 10, 2013); see also 
UN Climate Change Official Applauds US Climate Change Strategy, UN NEWS CTR. (June 25, 
2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45270#.Um0tb5SicV0. The 
IPCC operates with different figures that nonetheless show the clear gap to be closed: 
Global emissions cannot exceed 850 gigatons of carbon emissions, but the world has 
already emitted 530 gigatons, thus leaving only 350 gigatons to support the economic 
development that developing economies need. See Martha Kessler, Top UN Official Says 
Agreement Must Be Able to Accommodate Changes, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA) No. 189, 
at 5 (Sept. 30, 2013). 
8.  See Mitchell, supra note 7. 
9.  See id. 
10.  See IPCC, Climate Change, supra note 6, at SPM-3. 
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most of the 195 members of the UNFCCC, will be able to reach 
the required consensus on a new treaty within the next year, as 
they have, over the past two decades since the adoption of the 
UNFCCC, not been able to agree on significant substantive 
progress in the area. The good news is that they do not all have 
to. Without a doubt, most nations have neither played any 
significant role in the production of the problem nor do they 
have much real relevance to its solution.11 This Article thus 
argues that effective climate change action can be instigated by a 
much lower number of emitters than scholarly and policy-based 
discussions have promoted thus far, and that this is the only 
realistic solution in the timeframe at hand. The “magic 
number”12 or “critical mass” needed to give new impetus to 
climate action may be as little as just three nations, and is 
certainly less than “all the major emitters,” as most legal scholars 
have so persistently promoted, at least until recently. Precious 
time is ticking away. It is now necessary for international 
lawmakers and scholars to embrace less ideological, but more 
legally realistic, solutions to this issue, even though such 
solutions may not represent cosmopolitan ideals of democratic 
inclusiveness.13 The world urgently needs a solution that, in and 
of itself, can help alleviate at least some of the substantive 
problem, but that can also secondarily act as a catalyst for 
further treaty membership or replication. Some may argue that 
we do not have time to wait for such a stepped approach. The 
response to that is that we have no time to continue promoting 
and hoping for solutions that have already proved ineffective. If 
we wait for everyone to do something, nothing will happen. 
But, which are the most crucial nations to a new climate 
change leadership constellation? Should a new, narrowed 
                                                                                                               
11.  Eduado Viola, Brazilian Climate Policy since 2005: Continuity, Change and 
Perspective, CEPS Working Document, February 2013, at 2. 
12.  Moisés Naim, Minilateralism; The Magic Number to Get Real International Action, 
FOREIGN POLICY, July/August 2009, at 136. The “magic number” is defined as “the 
smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on 
solving a particular problem.” Id. at 135. 
13.  ”Cosmopolitan democracy posits not only the furthering of government by 
democratic popular election at a domestic level, but also the extension of democratic 
process to governance between states at a regional and global level.” Jeffrey Scott 
McGee, Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging Discourse within International Climate 
Change Governance, 8 PORTAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY INT’L STUDIES (2011), 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/portal/article/view/1873. 
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regime complex only include the historical and present major 
emitters? If so, is it realistic to hope that all of these major 
emitters will join? Would it be wiser to attempt other 
compositions such as the inclusion of nations that stand to bear 
the worst consequences of climate change and nations that seek 
the most far-reaching solutions, or would this present even 
worse gridlock? Is it even possible to assess the scientific, 
political, and symbolic dimensions of the “relevance” of nations 
in this context? 
This Article provides answers to the above questions. In 
doing so, it breaks with scholarly notions that have, by now, 
proved false. The Article challenges the viewpoint that all major 
emitters are needed to form part of a new climate treaty from 
the beginning. Even just a small handful of nations agreeing on 
action could cause a shift in the currently stalled talks. The 
Article also points out that whereas less-democratic negotiation 
methods may not be ideal, they serve important pragmatic 
functions in urgent contexts. In short, the Article promotes and 
applies a legal realism methodology. 
The Article first analyzes factors that have proved crucial to 
treaty success in recent and more historical contexts. Much 
current scholarship examines the same, relatively new, but of 
course highly relevant, treaties. It provides additional insight 
from a few of the world’s most successful treaties. These treaties 
happen to be of slightly older origins and have thus 
unfortunately become largely forgotten in today’s apparent rush 
to reinvent the treaty wheel. The findings of this Article can 
inform today’s treaty decision-making processes, in which parties 
and scholars often fail to think “outside the box” and learn from 
what has actually worked in the past instead of continually 
promoting solutions that currently do not. Resting on this 
foundation, the Article proposes a range of narrower 
constellations for a new regime-complex at the supranational 
scale that are more likely to be adopted than what has previously 
been envisioned by scholars and policy-makers. The Article also 
demonstrates that, in spite of some recent disappointment with 
the UNFCCC, this is still the most likely and best climate action 
governance architecture. Finally, the Article identifies nexuses 
to other international agreements and describes how these may 
work well as complements to, but not yet substitutes for, a 
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solution under the auspices of the UNFCCC. As the focus of the 
Article is on treaty development, treaty stipulations, compliance, 
and review, procedures are not addressed. 
Much excellent climate change scholarship has been 
produced in recent years. However, and respectfully, some of it 
no longer matches reality in international legal proceedings. 
The Article takes a legal realism approach and posits that 
enough theory has been written about who “should” join a new 
climate change treaty and why; the time has come to look at 
what can realistically be expected within the near future in this 
arena. As has so correctly been said, a small club of key emitters 
“could transform the credibility of climate actions and provide 
an effective alternative to over-ambitious global negotiations 
prone to [only] yield legal zombies.”14 The time has come to 
look at climate treaties in new ways. This Article does so. 
I. FACTORS DEFINING SUCCESS IN TREATY-MAKING; THE 
“HOW” 
This Section will analyze common denominators for success 
in the treaty negotiation context. In contrast to many other 
bodies of work, the focus here is not exclusively on multilateral 
environmental agreements (“MEAs”), although some highly 
illustrative ones are included. Rather, its focus is on select 
treaties aimed at improved international cooperation within 
economic and territorial issues, as well as science and 
technology-related treaties. The climate change discourse has so 
far focused extensively on environmental agreements, but much 
can be gained from broadening our views and learn lessons 
from, in particular, the financial context. This is so because, in 
contrast to popular belief, environmental agreements are not 
about the “morality” or “correctness” of being good stewards of 
our natural planetary environment; rather, they are, at bottom, 
mainly about money. If the considerations below—proven to 
work—are taken into account when negotiating a new climate 
treaty, success can once again be reached at the supranational 
level, even in relation to this almost hopelessly difficult problem. 
There is no need to reinvent the wheel in treaty drafting 
processes. 
                                                                                                               
14.  David Victor, Plan B for Copenhagen, 461 NATURE 342, 344 (2009). 
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As a threshold matter, “success” in the international 
environmental treaty context can be defined as the written 
instrument being a “focal point[] for building consensus and 
driving . . . change in policy, at the institutional, state and 
domestic levels.”15 Some of the most significant shared 
characteristics are as follows. 
A. Contextual Factors 
Treaties are not made in a vacuum. Rather, they aim to 
solve significant on-the-ground problems and address general 
global developments. The “exogenous shock theory” holds that 
external events increase the probability of treaty adoption 
success when a window of opportunity exists that can be used 
productively even if all other factors do not converge.16 
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established in 
1995 to regulate international trade in an unstoppably 
globalizing world. Thus, world trends helped pave the way 
towards the treaty negotiation and eventual adoption. In the 
case of the Antarctic Treaty System, analyzed in further detail 
below, general fears of war spilled over into the treaty 
negotiations, but with a positive result that lead to a host of 
nations ultimately adopting a treaty to, primarily, avoid 
territorial conflicts and war. In the case of the North Atlantic 
Fur Seal Treaty, also examined below, the extinction of an entire 
species of animals and the resulting collapse of significant 
industrial sectors in several nations were at issue, but did not 
always feature highly on the agenda of the involved nations.17 
In the final stages of treaty adoptions, a favorable domestic 
political climate is, of course, important, but the theory that 
success in regime formation can only occur when the specific 
issue enjoys a very high-priority status on the domestic agenda of 
                                                                                                               
15.  EMILY O’BRIEN & RICHARD GOWAN, N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION, 
WHAT MAKES ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS WORK: DEFINING FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 6 
(2012), available at http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
gowan_obrien_factors_success.pdf. 
16.  See Natalia Mirovitskaya et al., North Pacific Fur Seals: Regime Formation as a 
Means of Resolving Conflict, in POLAR POLITICS 22, 43 (Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko 
eds., 1993). 
17.  See id. at 44–45, 55. 
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each of the participants is simply false.18 In fact, the opposite of 
the oft-repeated hypothesis seems to apply. For example, “it was 
only after the issue [of seal extinction] had lost its priority on 
the domestic policy agendas of the parties and ceased to be 
considered an issue of high politics that it became possible to 
settle it rationally and coolly.”19 Of course, although a treaty-
related problem does not need to rank highest on a national 
agenda for eventual success, a favorable domestic political 
climate, including the will to act swiftly, is for good reason 
frequently considered crucial to the adoption of treaties.20 
In climate negotiations, recent weather events, along with 
the amount of sound science persistently presented by such 
reputable organizations as the IPCC and the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, present an opportune window of time and 
contextual background for adopting a new international 
agreement. However, attempts to give climate change an 
extremely high priority on the national agenda of a very large 
number of nations or even for the nations that are considered 
key in this context is a waste of precious time. It is simply a myth 
that climate change must feature higher on the political agenda 
for a treaty to be adopted. The good news is thus that even if 
climate change and closely related environmental issues do not 
rank as high as other issues among lawmakers (as is 
unfortunately the case in the United States and some other 
highly developed nations),21 it is sufficient if the leaders of a 
crucial amount of key nations can agree on a treaty.22 
                                                                                                               
18.  See id. at 44–45, 55. 
19.  See id. at 45. 
20.  See Camilla Bausch & Michael Mehling, Alternative Venues of Climate 
Cooperation: An Institutional Perspective, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 111, 132 
(Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds., 2013). 
21.  See TIMOTHY DEVINNEY ET AL., ANATOMY OF CIVIL SOCIETIES RESEARCH 
PROJECT, WHAT MATTERS TO AMERICANS: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VALUES 38, 
39, 46 (2012) (showing that “environmental sustainability” including climate change 
does not rank among the highest twenty-five out of 113 of the most importance to 
Americans, although it is not ranked among the bottom twenty-five either—the top 
three priorities for Americans are clean water and sanitation, the cost of daily living, 
and economic growth. The bottom three priorities are the right of commercial 
domain, protection against over-hunting/fishing, and intellectual property rights). 
22.  In the case of the United States, the executive negotiates and signs treaties 
whereas the Senate approves or rejects the resolution of ratification. See Treaties, U.S. 
SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
briefing/Treaties.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
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B. Incentivizing Participation 
Most important to the adoption and success of a treaty, 
both positive incentives for participation and negative 
disincentives for non-participation must be present. Much 
current discourse speaks to what nations “should” do and what 
our “moral obligations” are. Although it cannot be ignored that 
some nations may respond to moral arguments, it is clear that at 
least in the American reality, calculations regarding climate 
mitigation strategies are primarily a matter of cost-benefit 
analysis. This includes the attitude taken by the United States in 
connection with the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol “because 
the benefits of doing so were perceived to be outweighed by the 
potential costs to the US economy.”23 Previous efforts have 
amply shown that rhetoric describing the risks involved in 
climate change does not suffice; economic incentives are 
indispensible.24 This is particularly true in relation to the United 
States and China, two perceived key players for whom unilateral 
emissions reductions are insufficient drivers due to the negative 
outcome of cost-benefit analyses.25 Simply put, major polluters 
have so far had too little to gain and too much to lose from 
Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emissions reductions.26 Thus, simply 
discussing “risks” and moral obligations is not enough; 
monetary benefits must form part of the rhetoric. 
1. The Money 
The Montreal and Kyoto Protocols demonstrate the 
economic considerations involved when some nations, 
particularly the United States, decide whether or not to join a 
treaty regime. 
In the case of the Montreal Protocol, US officials were 
aware that the nation’s own citizens were at grave risk from 
depletion of the ozone layer and that even purely unilateral 
                                                                                                               
23.  Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1537–38 (2009). 
24.  Cass Sunstein, The World vs. The United States and China? The Complex Climate 
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1676 
(2008). 
25.  Id. at 1677. 
26.  Id. at 1680. 
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action was still very much in the nation’s interest.27 The costs of 
unilateral action to the United States without the Protocol were 
calculated to be US$21 billion, the same as with the Protocol.28 
However, the benefits to the nation of an international 
agreement were almost triple: US$3575 billion with a concord 
compared to US$1373 billion without one.29 These figures were 
derived by, among other things, calculating the costs of the 
projected five million skin cancer deaths and twenty-five million 
cataract cases without global treaty action, compared to 200,000 
and two million, respectively, with global action.30 Presented 
with these facts, President Ronald Reagan—not otherwise an 
environmentally inclined president—pushed hard for the 
adoption of the Protocol.31 Because of these persuasive 
economic considerations and, of course, other motivators as 
well, other nations became willing to adopt the treaty. 
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States would, 
in contrast, have to spend more than US$300 billion to gain 
monetized benefits of only 4% of that amount.32 A 2.5°C 
increase has been calculated to lead to damages as a percentage 
of the gross domestic product (“GDP”) of key nations as follows: 
India, 4.93% (with an expected loss of 3,600,000 years of human 
life); Africa 3.93% (with the loss of 26,677,000 years of life in 
Sub-Saharan Africa); Europe, 2.83%; United States, 0.45%; and 
China, 0.22% (with a loss of 603,000 years of human life).33 
Russia, however, stands to benefit by a 0.65% GDP increase by 
some calculations.34 As will be shown below, Russia’s official 
attitude towards climate change is hesitant because of the 
perceived benefits to it of climate change and its self-proclaimed 
“better” ability to deal with climate change than other nations. 
Accordingly, Russia is seen as the “most difficult country”35 in 
climate negotiations. Russia must, then, have reasons for both 
                                                                                                               
27.  Id. at 1679. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. at 1680. 
33.  Id. at 1683–84. 
34.  See id.; see also Viola, supra note 11, at 2. 
35.  See Viola, supra note 11. 
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joining and observing the treaty beyond a concern for the 
climate itself. 
The United States stands to lose 0.45% to 1.2% of GDP with 
a 3°C temperature increase.36 For the United States, however, 
“only” 13,080 additional deaths are to be expected from climate 
change, which could be seen as not “so bad” given the fact that 
car accidents result in over 40,000 deaths per year.37 Further 
economic factors may be more persuasive: the average annual 
agricultural productivity is expected to decrease by 39% due to 
climate change just as water costs have been projected to 
increase by 31.3%.38 The above figures reflect what has become 
the accepted norm of a temperature increase of “only” 2.5–3°C. 
Catastrophic warming would be more expensive and the 
prevention of that could thus function as a better driver: The 
loss to the US GDP because of more extreme warning would be 
22.1%, the same as for Africa and China, whereas Russia would 
suffer a loss of 33.2% of GDP and Europe and India 44.2% 
each.39 
Thus, if one believes that the projected temperature 
increase can indeed be limited to 2.5–3°C, major GHG 
contributors face the cost problem that by some calculations, 
they have “little” to gain from emissions reductions and much to 
lose.40 This goes for the United States as well—recall that the 
benefits to the United States from tackling ozone depletion was 
roughly sixty-five times the costs, whereas with climate change, 
benefits to be gained are only three times the costs.41 Narrowly 
perceived, key nations have so far not seen themselves as 
potential victims of climate change. Hopefully, this perception 
can be changed via economic and other motivators; otherwise 
                                                                                                               
36.  See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1683–84. 
37.  Id. at 1693. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. at 1692. 
40.  Id. at 1680. In contrast, a recent UN report warns of “vast” economic damage 
and “severe” economic disruptions caused by climate change. Justin Gillis, U.N. Says 
Lag in Confronting Climate Woes Will Be Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/science/earth/un-says-lag-in-confronting-climate-woes-
will-be-costly.html?_r=0 
41.  See Frances Cairncross, What Makes Environmental Treaties Work?, 
CONVERSATION (July 29, 2008), http://conservationmagazine.org/2008/07/what-
makes-environmental-treaties-work/. 
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we may well find ourselves in the dire straits predicted by much 
research so far. 
It is clear that economic factors are important incentives for 
both the developed and the developing world, but they are also 
important deterrents. It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
identify the most effective “sticks” in this context, but frequently 
mentioned factors include trade restrictions and sanctions, 
carbon markets, and carbon taxes. As an example, the Montreal 
Protocol used both economic rewards for poorer countries that 
complied with the agreement as well as trade restrictions and 
other “punishments” such as trade restrictions for countries that 
did not.42 Such threats contributed to changes in state behavior, 
which demonstrates the crucial importance of economic 
considerations to MEAs. It may, frankly, be necessary to give 
treaty participants that otherwise would lose out on economic 
side payments (“bribes”)43 to offset some of their costs of 
participation.44 If this helped secure an agreement, everyone 
would ultimately be a winner as there can no longer be any 
doubt that continuing the current status quo would ultimately 
be a loss to all. 
The North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911 (“Seal 
Treaty”) and the United States-Japan telecommunications 
agreement similarly came to life based on commercial interests. 
Hailed as “one of the most successful treaties ever negotiated,”45 
the Seal Treaty was the first international treaty to address the 
issue of wildlife conservation and still represents “a major victory 
for the conservation of natural resources, a signal triumph of 
diplomacy . . ., and a landmark in the history of international 
cooperation.”46 The Seal Treaty protected North Pacific Fur 
Seals from pelagic hunting, which had almost driven the species 
to extinction, and inspired subsequent national legislation such 
as the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 in the United 
States.47 Fur seals were a major source of income for the four key 
                                                                                                               
42.  See id.; see also McGee, supra note 13, at 14. 
43.  See Cairncross, supra note 41. 
44.  See id. 
45.  See id. 
46.  North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty of 1911, NOAA CELEBRATES 200 YEARS SCI., 
SERVICE, & STEWARDSHIP, http://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/events/fursealtreaty/
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treaty actors at the time: the United States, Russia, Great Britain 
(on behalf of Canada), and Japan. The prosperous branches of 
the economy in these nations were, at least in large part, based 
on the same resource, the seal, and their wealth had been 
diminished by the nations’ collective, but unregulated efforts.48 
Economic, not environmental, concerns were the primary 
motivators behind the Seal Treaty negotiations.49 Once experts 
agreed that the overall health of the seal population was at risk, 
consensus on developing a treaty was reached in spite of the 
existence of some minor scientific uncertainties.50 This brings 
hope to the current climate context, where a few scientific 
uncertainties are still cited in some circles. As the Seal Treaty 
shows, this can be overcome. In fact, climate arguments are 
currently even more scientifically sound than the seal 
discussions of a century ago were, as it can no longer reasonably 
be argued that whatever few uncertainties still exist justify non-
action in the climate arena. But whereas modern economies rely 
to a large extent on fossil fuels just as nations at the time 
depended on sealing, our wealth has not yet been diminished by 
our fossil fuel dependency, which contrasts with the Seal Treaty 
background and may make it harder for nations to reach 
consensus on a climate treaty. There is still very much money to 
gain by using fossil fuels unless such use becomes regulated in 
much more far-reaching ways than is currently the case.51 
Carbon prices may have to be raised via taxes; undoubtedly a 
sound step from a scientific point of view although not 
politically popular in the United States. That finances played a 
large role in the development of the Seal Treaty is further 
demonstrated by the fact that the Japanese and 
British/Canadian delegations outright demanded and obtained 
proper compensation before consenting to the treaty.52 In other 
words, the bargaining at the time was financially integrative and 
interest-based. Parties to a new climate deal can learn from this 
and take legal formative action on the realization that without 
                                                                                                               
48.  See Mirovitskaya, supra note 16, at 54. 
49.  See id. at 40, 53-–54. 
50.  See id. at 39, 44, 52–53. 
51.  See generally Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING 
STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, at 52, 53–60. 
52.  See Mirovitskaya, supra note 16, at 32, 39. 
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economic support to poorer nations and an overall working out 
of economic interests among participants, a treaty may not come 
about. Nothing new in that; a hundred years of international 
diplomacy has shown the “pragmatic soundness” of that 
approach. 
However, when comparing the climate experiment to the 
Seal Treaty, a consideration to be taken into account is that seals 
were an international common property. Entry to the sealing 
scheme by non-sealing nations was deterred in order to limit the 
use of this common resource.53 In contrast, a stable climate is, in 
similarity with ozone protection under the Montreal Protocol, a 
public good requiring the effective management of national 
resources for the good of all nations. Entry to the carbon market 
by some nations cannot be deterred, unless a major paradigm 
shift occurs under which climate rights also come to be seen as 
property rights. This could stem from a clearer understanding 
that fossil fuels are, at bottom, also a property resource that, 
although individually owned by sovereign nations and their 
corporations, is also, at a greater scale, a resource shared by the 
relatively few number of nations who possess the resource. These 
are arguably the nations that must come together in creating a 
new treaty. 
The Seal Treaty also shows the potential interplay between 
equity and efficiency concerns: in the short term, it would have 
been more efficient for the relevant nations to continue 
hunting, but eventually, doing so would have turned inefficient 
because of the likely extinction of the entire resource. Equity 
prevailed. Under the “salient solution theory,” parties can, as 
with the Seal Treaty, be made to realize that they have to 
cooperatively accept legal restrictions or, ultimately, stand to 
lose significantly at an individual as well as a collective basis. 
Similar efficiency concerns will have to be utilized in climate 
change: efforts to persuade hesitant parties must continue to 
rely on the ultimate inefficiency at a national level in continuing 
efforts that will lead to economic inefficiencies. The problem, of 
course, is to convince such parties that their individual action 
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will help and to find ways to effectively address the leakage 
problem.54 
The so-called United States/Japan telecommunications 
agreement (“telecom agreement”) similarly took off on a 
nationally motivated economic platform.55 At bottom, the 
United States demanded increased market access to the 
Japanese market to rectify a large trade deficit between the two 
nations in the telecommunications sector.56 This move found 
support in a global ideological shift away from national 
monopolies and toward international competition, although 
deep domestic policy change was not initially forthcoming.57 
After years of extended negotiations that were often highly 
coercive towards Japan, both parties eventually came to an 
agreement when Japan’s trade ministry and political elite saw 
the United States’ demands as being in the interest of Japan 
too.58 Telecommunications networks, providers of vital 
infrastructure for other economic activity, were seen as stimuli 
for economic growth. For the first time, policy issues were 
framed strictly using economic criteria in the international 
rhetoric.59 Today, carbon is similarly seen as a backbone for 
current economic growth. Economic rhetoric must thus be 
embraced in the discussions pertaining to a new treaty to an 
even larger extent than before. 
                                                                                                               
54.  In the climate context, “leakage” denotes the risk that if some nations curb 
excessive Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emissions from their territories, GHG-producing 
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bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan subsequent to the Tokyo 
Round under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) auspices in the 
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57.  Id. at 59. 
58.  See id. at 52, 54, 67. 
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In short, economic motivators are key to treaty formation. 
The Montreal Protocol, Seal Treaty, and telecom agreement 
demonstrate this point, yet also show that even though finances 
are one of, or even, the primary motivators behind an 
agreement, much substantive success can be created. This holds 
for the environmental agenda as well. As scholars, we ought to 
stop what has turned into a somewhat naïve rhetoric that keeps 
discussing what nations “should” do for “moral” reasons. Let us 
become more realistic: money simply appears to matter more 
than the environment per se in climate discussions, both 
nationally and internationally. Softer arguments such as moral 
obligations, animal extinction, the future displacement of 
millions of people (which all of course also have economic 
implications), and even military arguments, are not currently 
the most persuasive “talking points” in the climate discourse. 
Key policy makers have demonstrated this. For example, 
President Obama’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan describes the 
motivating factors for the nation adopting such a plan.60 This 
Plan makes no less than sixteen references to the economy, jobs, 
technology, oil independence, and health (for the purpose of 
this Article considered an economic motivator), but only four 
references to “moral obligation” itself or factors such as “future 
generations,” “national treasure[s],” and “snow-capped 
peaks.”61 Similarly, whereas a speech by Secretary of State John 
Kerry to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit in 
Bali in October 2013 called action on climate change an 
“international moral responsibility,” it also described it as “a 
practical business responsibility.” The speech further 
emphasized that failure to act on climate change would create 
uncertainty in the business community, but that finding 
solutions to the problem will create a US$6 trillion industry over 
the following decades, dwarfing the technology industry 
revolution of the 1990s.62 
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It is evident that work on a new climate treaty must take the 
business and economic interests of key parties into account and 
make sure that these are addressed satisfactorily to these parties. 
The political awareness of the economy behind climate change 
cannot be ignored. Incidentally, economic aspects are also 
crucial to garner the politically required public support for a 
new climate agreement: a new scientific study reveals that costs 
are the most important factor affecting public opinion of 
climate agreements and that people are more willing to support 
such agreements if they involve lower household costs. For 
example, an increase in average household costs to support 
climate mitigation from 0.5% to 1% of the GDP decreases public 
support by ten percentage points.63 
2. “Rights-based” Rhetoric 
In the climate treaty negotiation context, the United States 
is often lamenting the fact that China, India, and other 
emerging economies are sticking to their “rights to develop” 
and are thus not willing to undertake total emissions reductions 
targets. But, such rights-based arguments are also not new in 
international treaty law and thus need not stand in the way now 
either. The Antarctic Treaty System of 1961 (“ATS”) shows as 
much. “One of the successes of twentieth century international 
law,”64 the ATS was negotiated by twelve original signatories, 
seven of which claimed rights to Antarctica as territorial 
sovereigns.65 Although all parties eventually came to share the 
ultimate goals of promoting science and using the region for 
peaceful purposes, national territorial interests were the true 
impetus for the treaty—not science, as myth otherwise has it.66 
Granted, science was used as a tool of diplomacy, but it was 
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63.  Jordan, supra note 62. 
64.  Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty System: A Model of Legal Creativity and 
Cooperation, in SCIENCE DIPLOMACY: ANTARCTICA, SCIENCE, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SPACES 39 (Paul Arthur Berkman et al. eds., 2009). 
65.  Id. at 40. 
66.  See generally Rip Bulkeley, The Political Origins of the Antarctic Treaty, 46 POLAR 
REC., no. 1, Jan. 2010, at 9. 
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mainly for the added advantage of preventing unnecessary and 
undesirable political rivalries in the region, as well as the 
recurrence of international misunderstandings.67 Similar to 
climate change, a practical legal solution was not forthcoming at 
the international level: the treaty had to be created first. The 
timing of the treaty was remarkable: it was adopted during the 
Cold War with the participation of then-arch enemies the Soviet 
Union (“USSR”) and the United States, along with such 
competitors for rights to explore the region as Argentina, Chile, 
Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, none of which were 
willing to give up their asserted rights. Seemingly irreconcilable 
differences existed, but nonetheless, a workable strategy was 
developed around common objectives. A “pooled sovereignty” 
model had first been suggested, but as individual territorial 
claims were too difficult to overcome, Chile instead proposed 
the current “status quo” solution under which territorial claims 
should be “frozen” through a moratorium on new claims.68 The 
treaty now has forty-six members, only five of whom mutually 
recognize the territorial claims of the others.69 
Modernly, potential treaty parties—most noticeably the 
United States—similarly must come to terms with the fact that 
some nations will not give up their national rights arguments 
pertaining to development. No one can seriously dispute the 
right of poorer nations to do so. Instead, a “status quo” solution 
might be found in relation to climate change as well, but by 
reframing the problem. For instance, status quo in climate 
change could and must encompass the right to retain increasing 
levels of development. But, instead of asking whether or not 
nations are “entitled” to develop—of course they are—the 
correct question is whether nations are necessarily entitled to 
base such development on GHG emissions, or whether—with 
crucial economic and other assistance—they can reach the 
desired levels of development based on non-GHG sources. A 
difficult question indeed, but if arch enemies could agree on a 
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treaty during the Cold War, one would hope that key 
negotiating parties could not only come to the table, but could 
also reach an agreement in these more peaceful times. The ATS 
shows that irreconcilable supranational differences can be 
overcome with persistence and innovative diplomacy. As with 
the ATS, operational and scientific cooperation is also currently 
needed in order for all nations to be able to share the natural 
“resource” in the future. At the time of the ATS, the “resource” 
was a region with potentially fruitful scientific development. 
Now, a healthy environment must be seen as a precious resource 
with a proven effect of economic development. In the ATS 
context, widely divergent political interests existed within the 
realm of both the problem itself (use of the resource) as well as 
outside the problem (broader economic concerns), in the same 
way as they do now in the current ongoing global financial crisis. 
In some ways, the ATS may be seen as factually and 
contextually different from current climate change, but in other 
ways, there are strong resemblances that justify the comparison. 
Just as the ATS member nations were motivated by national 
territorial concerns, so too does the climate rhetoric have 
significant national security implications. Both regimes implicate 
the development and use of science for peaceful, yet nationally 
advantageous, reasons. Even the physical surroundings are 
somewhat similar: the Antarctic is a very remote and ethereal 
region, as is the atmosphere, but both areas came to require a 
supranational solution. The ATS thus sets valuable precedent 
for how nations may come to give up old arguments and start 
over using new, shared goals as a platform for success—even 
during times with a highly volatile international political climate 
and seemingly insurmountable legal obstacles. Perhaps most 
noticeably, the ATS used an ecosystem approach at a time when 
arms races and military prowess were otherwise higher on the 
international agenda. If the mutual goals of peace, science, and 
“even” the environment had the power to supersede political, 
economic, and military interests, then surely they do now as well. 
3. The Science 
As shown above, the fact that “the science” behind treaty 
developments is difficult, and even controversial at times, is not 
a hindrance to eventual treaty success. The telecom agreement, 
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the ATS, the Seal Treaty and, in particular, the Montreal 
Protocol all involved complex scientific and technical issues, but 
still found a common platform on which to stand. In fact, as the 
ATS and Montreal Protocol show, scientific motivators often 
function as crucial drivers in treaty negotiations and drafting. 
C. Negotiation “Champions” 
More unknown than the role of national actors, but 
perhaps equally important in the treaty drafting process, is the 
role played by individual “champions.”70 This oft-forgotten 
aspect of treaty-making could beneficially be re-applied in 
upcoming climate negotiations. Strong leadership not only by 
nations, but also by individuals, is needed in treaty work.71 
In the case of the ATS, the work performed by prominent 
individuals helped spur action and paved some of the way for 
the eventual treaty adoption. Informal talks began when 
President Eisenhower issued a letter to the US ambassadors to 
all governments taking part in the International Geophysical 
Year (“IGY”).72 This letter outlined mutual goals and asserted 
that a treaty could be created “without requiring any 
participating nation to renounce whatever basic historic rights it 
may have” in the region.73 A subsequent gathering at the private 
residence of Dr. James Van Allen—a prominent scientist who 
played a large role in planning the IGY—prompted the 
suggestion of a coordinated international science effort and thus 
helped shift focus from contested national claims between 
intensely rivaling nations to peaceful international cooperation 
for scientific purposes.74 Without the impetus by leaders in both 
the scientific and political communities, the treaty may not have 
been adopted. 
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When Japan wanted more than the 25% share of the seal 
harvest offered to it in connection with the negotiations leading 
up to the Seal Treaty, President Taft sent a direct, personal 
appeal to the Emperor of Japan calling for “friendly relations 
between the Japanese and American nations” as the 
preservation of the seals was “of importance to all the nations of 
the world,” which helped ensure Japanese participation.75 At the 
time, direct involvement by national leaders in treaty 
negotiations was rare, but these examples demonstrate that 
personal relations and the structural leadership provided by 
world leaders can help move agendas forward. Two 
entrepreneurial leaders were key to the Seal Treaty as well, 
demonstrating the importance of involving businesses and other 
non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) in treaty 
developments, controversial as that may sound to 
environmentalists. In the telecom agreement, the US Secretary 
of State intervened at an early stage, which similarly shows the 
importance of high-level political pressure by well-known 
actors.76 
In the Montreal process, United Nations Environment 
Programme (“UNEP”) executive director Mostafa Tolba was an 
impartial, but important, negotiator.77 In the climate context, 
Lord Stern and former British Prime Minister David Cameron 
have been mentioned as potential future political champions in 
driving the intergovernmental processes forward.78 Lord Stern 
has already contributed much to the discourse. Several other 
candidates come to mind: Kofi Annan, Al Gore, and Connie 
Hedegaard, for example. It does not appear to matter exactly 
who is chosen to play this crucial role as long as somebody is 
chosen, and as long as that somebody has sufficient clout and 
diplomatic skills to influence even very “stubborn” parties. 
Non-state actors should also be included, potentially in a 
two-step process that starts with an inclusive multi-stakeholder 
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conversation, but ends with an intergovernmental agreement.79 
Involvement by civil society, including a coalescence of public 
interest NGOs and businesses, is understood to be key, especially 
in treaty compliance contexts.80 
D. Coercion, Secrecy and Other Undemocratic Traits 
Perhaps one of the most prevailing aspects of international 
legal scholarship is the notion that a new climate treaty should 
be negotiated in transparent, fully democratic, and collaborative 
ways. Less appealing negotiation techniques are often ignored. 
This Section shows how reality often varies from academic ideals 
pertaining to treaty developments. 
1. Unilaterality and Coercion as Steps Towards Broader 
Agreements 
Mahatma Gandhi famously said, “Be the change that you 
wish to see in the world.” That is, for sure, laudable in the 
private context, but unilateral action does not work in the 
international context unless also supplemented by at least 
bilateral and, most likely, multilateral steps. 
The background to the Seal Treaty shows how resources 
shared among several nations are prone to overuse when 
countries pursue unilateral policies and goals.81 The United 
States initially attempted various unilateral technical fixes to 
solve the problem. For example, the nation exerted some 
“moral leadership” in the area, appealed to international law, 
sought diplomatic interventions, petitioned for arbitrations, 
attempted unilateral trade restrictions, and even threatened 
unilateral military action—all to no avail.82 The United States 
even considered moving the threatened seal population from 
the ocean to inland lakes to protect it, which presented the 
problem that no food was available for the ocean-feeding seals 
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in lakes.83 At one point, the United States even went so far as to 
suggest exterminating a certain herd completely out of spite if 
Britain refused to cooperate.84 Only a subsequent four-party 
agreement solved the problem; not these other attempted types 
of statecraft.85 Below, the telecom agreement will show how 
unilateral pressures can work, but only in conjunction with 
other techniques. In other words, unilateral action and threats 
can be instrumental in multilateral contexts, but are not the 
determinant factor.86 Information exchange and cooperative 
interaction during the negotiation stages are more important.87 
If self-motivation at the national level does not occur and 
unilateral action does not suffice, can some international “stick” 
be applied to drive recalcitrant parties towards agreement? As 
shown by the telecom agreement, perhaps such a “stick” would 
suffice, although coercion is more likely to work in tandem with 
multilateral track diplomacy. 
Before the telecom agreement, the United States 
threatened Japan with bilateral trade sanctions in direct contrast 
to multilateral policies against limited reciprocity.88 The US 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) exerted pressure on Japan.89 
Section 301 petitions under the Trade Act of 197490 were used as 
a negotiation weapon.91 As an additional threat, a draft 
telecommunications access bill was proposed that would have 
used Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
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certification procedures to slow or prohibit imports from 
foreign countries that did not open their markets to US 
telecommunications products or services.92 The FCC proposed 
to introduce legislation calling for minimum pricing 
benchmarks based on narrow reciprocity.93 In other words, the 
United States openly sought to punish “unfair traders” within 
the telecommunications sector.94 The discourse was often 
adversarial as opposed to collaborative.95 The ultimate 
agreement reached was thus not negotiated through inclusive, 
democratic and politically correct means. Arguably, the United 
States more or less “bullied” Japan into compliance. Japan 
correctly perceived the process as coercive, which seriously 
damaged the US-Japanese relationship.96 Japan further 
lamented that it alone had to compromise, not the United 
States.97 However, the mix of coercion with some positive 
interaction and persuasion in relation to the monetary benefits 
that Japan stood to gain through an agreement eventually led 
Japan away from only trying to avoid possible losses by being 
named under Section 301, and towards the ultimate 
agreement.98 More collaboratively, in 1995 the G7 dedicated a 
meeting to the topic which helped share the core consensus and 
ensure support from the broader WTO process, albeit again 
with warnings from the USTR. A crucial “interest redefinition” 
happened when Japan came to see trade liberalization as being 
in its own national economic interest.99 Thus, coercion may have 
only worked in conjunction with the broader positive incentives. 
The final WTO agreements were reached in more 
democratically appealing ways, but, even so, the talks under that 
framework were, first and foremost, designed to satisfy the 
underlying needs and interests of the dominant players, not all 
the players.100 There was an “inner circle” that harmonized its 
members’ policies while countries on the outskirts of the circle 
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spent time catching up.101 This not only shows a degree of 
undemocratic egotism or nationalist economic interests at play, 
but it also the possibility of narrower agreements broadening 
when secondary actors are coaxed into moving along with other 
nations. Thus, in the telecom agreement, a double strategy was 
used wherein coercive threats were used in conjunction with 
multilateral track diplomacy.102 This interplay between 
cooperative processes and coercive pressure was paramount in 
inducing change at that time,103 and it may be with climate 
change now. 
Coercion was particularly effective because of the highly 
technical nature of the telecommunications problem.104 Because 
climate change is just as technically complex, if not more, less 
democracy and more “old-fashioned” diplomatic coercion may 
thus also be fruitful in egging some parties along. 
In contrast, pure coercion appears unlikely to function well 
as an exclusive negotiation tactic. There is a demonstrated link 
between use of coercive tactics and instability of outcomes.105 
Over time, coercion leads to a breakdown in relationships.106 
Coercion is more likely to be tolerated if the underlying 
relationship is strong or if state behavior demonstrates 
willingness to improve the relationship.107 Currently, the US-
Sino relationship, for example, is very likely not strong enough 
to support any attempted “coercion” in the climate context no 
matter the degree of such pressure. The relationship seems to 
rest on a very delicate platform. Just as cautious optimism for a 
climate agreement between the two parties seems warranted, the 
ebb and flow of this relationship changes, thus making any US 
attempts to convince China to adopt binding agreements seem 
futile. Other national actors may be more open towards 
diplomatic pressure than China. 
At bottom, the success of coercive tactics is contingent 
upon channeling negotiations into broader, more collaborative 
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contexts. To be successful, difficult international talks should be 
progressively multilateralized. 
2. Secrecy and Early Examples of Exclusion 
In the case of the ATS, the US Department of State initially 
issued a secret policy paper seeking to eliminate international 
disputes over the territory, preserve the continent for science, 
and protect US interests.108 Initially, the United States was 
predominantly interested in denying access to the area to 
potential enemies—such as the USSR—and to prevent Soviet 
influence over it.109 The State Department’s review of US policy 
led to bilateral talks with Great Britain about options for the 
desirable level of “internationalization” of the continent.110 
These talks were only later widened to include six other 
governments with territorial claims in Antarctica and, 
subsequently, other governments with IGY committees running 
stations on the continent.111 Initially, the USSR was thus not a 
party to the talks, but was included in a cartel outside the UN 
architecture.112 India, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru were also 
excluded from initial negotiations.113 The USSR conducted itself 
in a positive, open-minded manner throughout the 
international discussions, as the nation wanted inclusion into, 
not exclusion from, the ATS.114 Later, when the USSR was 
included in plans for a possible international solution, the 
United States and the USSR conducted no less than sixty secret 
meetings in preparation for the treaty.115 At one stage of the 
negotiations, the parties reached a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
under which the negotiating governments agreed not to 
“engage in legal or political argumentation” over Antarctic 
sovereignty issues during the IGY.116 Although a seemingly small 
aspect of the overall agreement, it at least shows how parties may 
agree on a period of “truce” in otherwise deadlocked political 
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discussions when something else is perceived to be a higher 
priority on the international agenda. This is arguably the 
current case with the climate change crisis, where scientific 
reality must, or, for the lack of a better word, should, be seen to 
override political and economic difficulties. 
The above shows how undemocratic treaty negotiations can 
be and probably often are. For example, secret papers are 
circulated among key participants. Exclusive clubs are formed. 
Such club formation is not unknown at the supranational scene 
either—some nations reach behind-the-scenes agreements in 
phases and with a limited range of participants, at least to begin 
with. To a very large extent, these shape the ultimate agreement 
whether or not all nations “like” this process and the resulting 
outcomes. In fact, true broad consensus is rare. Nations do not 
deal with each other exclusively, but rather seek to promote 
their own interests by negotiating faceted agreements into place 
with others before reaching an ultimate supranational 
agreement. Yet despite such seemingly undemocratic facets of 
international law-making, nations eventually do find reasons to 
join the adopted schemes and coalitions. This also goes for 
organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) and the groups of major 
economies such as the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors (“G20”). Even as regards to the 
otherwise quite inclusion-seeking (and “politically correct”) 
European Union, it has become known that Turkey simply is not 
a desirable member, and likely will not be for a long time to 
come. Shameful, perhaps, but the reality is that from 
kindergartens to international forums, political coalitions arise 
and agreements are made in ways that are not necessarily 
democratic. The crucial matter, however, is that substantively 
desirable goals can be reached even through procedurally 
questionable actions. Perhaps the end justifies the means, at 
least when it comes to climate change. The world has become so 
used to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol resting on solid 
“cosmopolitan democratic”117 principles and near-universal 
participation that it might, at first glance, be difficult to imagine 
alternatives. But they do exist, even under the United Nations 
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auspices. For example, the UN Security Council also does not 
employ a broadly democratic process: only the five permanent 
members have veto power over substantive resolutions. The ten 
additional rotating non-permanent members do not. In all, 
fifteen Security Council members vote on matters that could 
affect no less than 193 nations; the total membership of the 
United Nations. True democracy is, of course, the ideal, but in 
the climate context, it is arguably less important over the next 
few months and years than reaching a substantively effective 
solution. Procedural fairness could then be improved. 
E. Bilaterality and Progressive Multilateralism 
The call for the participation of “all major emitters” in a 
new climate treaty still permeates the international climate 
discourse. This Article posits that as few as two parties can kick 
start a new international agreement. International law 
precedent supports this argument as follows. 
During the initial stages of the development of the United 
States-Japan telecommunications agreement, “key states . . . 
migrate[d] away from the multilateralism of the [International 
Telecommunication Union] towards ‘more effective’ and ‘less 
time consuming’ bilateral and plurilateral channels.”118 After 
several high-level bilateral meetings and much pressure, Japan 
responded affirmatively to all points demanded of it.119 The 
United States also worked with Canada, several European 
nations, Brazil, and India to eventually reach a broader 
international impact in the telecommunications industry, but at 
first sought to achieve this in a bilateral manner.120 When 
nations were egged along by the general trend of 
internationalization in telecommunications and, further, came 
to realize that what had first been seen as problems actually 
represented inherent gains for national industry players, the 
agreements that started out as sets of bilateral agreements 
between the United States and the above parties became topics 
for further expansion under the auspices of the OECD.121 At 
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first, four difficult impasse points were discussed at length within 
the relatively small OECD forum until virtual consensus had 
been achieved.122 Only then were negotiations displaced by the 
broader, binding, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”)/WTO forum.123 Multilateral talks at the WTO level 
only arose after a core consensus had been developed via, first, 
unilateral action in the form of the United States coercing Japan 
to agree or face sanctions, then tough bilateral negotiations and 
information exchanges, and further broadened international 
negotiations at the OECD level.124 Under the WTO auspices, the 
“Reference Paper” was eventually developed.125 This is a 
framework of pro-competitive regulatory policies that is not 
legally binding in and of itself, but becomes binding with 
additional commitments by the parties.126 
The above procedures show how high-level national interest 
in the United States can lead other key actors into adopting an 
integral and crucial bilateral agreement which, crucially in the 
climate context, can lead to much broader and deeper binding 
multilateral action under an already existing architecture. When 
the United States has both the economic interest and the 
political will, it can be the instigator of action at the 
international level. Bilaterality is still common in the trade 
context. For example, in the GATT/WTO context, legal 
frameworks are often translated into binding commitments via 
breakout bilateral treaties among individual states.127 
Another example of how broader international agreements 
can be reached from a very narrow starting point is the WTO 
schedules. The WTO operates with a set of general rules that 
apply to all members, but also specific commitments 
(“schedules”) initially made by individual member 
governments.128 All WTO members have a schedule of 
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concessions that reflect specific tariff concessions and other 
commitments that nations have agreed to in the context of trade 
negotiations such as the Uruguay Round.129 The schedules 
record commitments to progressively remove barriers to the 
international trade in goods and services, and serve as a starting 
point for future trade negotiations.130 The content of the 
schedules change over time to take account of different 
modifications, such as GATT Article XXVIII negotiations or 
rectification procedures.131 Each individual WTO member 
schedule is an agreement among all members, and no changes 
can be introduced without the approval of all members.132 
In contrast, the Seal Treaty development process shows how 
bilateral agreements may not work well when there is a risk of 
“leakage,” as there is with climate change. In an arbitration 
agreement between the United States and Great Britain on 
behalf of Canada, the WTO tribunal had held for Britain and 
limited the United States jurisdiction to hunt seals to only three 
miles from shore.133 This ruling was observed, but circumvented 
by sealers moving to other areas of the ocean, by United States 
(and Great Britain) sealers flying the flag of other nations in 
order to continue sealing, and by other entrants on the sealing 
scene, such as Japan, who were not affected by the arbitration 
ruling.134 It became clear then, as it might be with climate 
change now, that a comprehensive agreement covering all the 
major powers in the area was needed.135 Nonetheless, the Seal 
Treaty still shows that even though major powers may be needed 
for eventual successful treaty developments, bilateral talks can 
lead to broader legal regimes. The Seal Treaty process quickly 
grew from two to five nations in the closing treaty stages; enough 
to secure a substantive success (the affected seal herd, almost 
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extinguished, grew to two million not many years later).136 The 
Seal Treaty also shows that a very large number of nations need 
not be involved in a treaty for it to be successful. The crux is 
typically whether the parties with a major economic interest at 
stake come to an agreement. 
In short, bilaterality may well prove conducive, at least 
initially, in the climate change context. Two parties will probably 
not have the sufficient substantive effect on an eventual 
resolution of the underlying climate change problem, but as has 
been demonstrated, two key players can pave the way for a 
subsequent sufficiently broad treaty participation. “[B]ilateral 
teeth and multilateral intellect” are key in international law 
formation.137 Such progressive multilateralism was also seen in 
the case of the ATS, which started with twelve parties but 
increased to forty-six. Similarly, economic/political 
organizations such as the G20, and even the European Union 
also started relatively small. For example, the European Union 
began with narrow agreements on steel and coal among six 
nations. It is now arguably one of the most successful 
international governance examples in the world with twenty-
eight member nations in Europe and much influence on 
international affairs such as, in particular, climate change. 
Treaty development is all about the “process, not just a piece of 
paper.”138 
As has been seen in the climate change context, attempting 
to bring everyone to the table too early and incorporating too 
many and too diverse interests destroys whatever negotiating 
momentum may otherwise have been built up, especially when 
addressing highly technical problems. Instead, taking a step 
back, starting with key bilateral agreements and gradually 
building up momentum is more effective. Together, bi- and 
multilaterality make up a “single negotiation space,” but one 
approach may not work without the other. To be sure, time has 
almost run out for very limited approaches, but, on the other 
hand, there may also not be time not to try this approach. They 
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may well prove effective in the climate context as they have in 
other areas the past. 
F. Club Formation 
One of the perhaps most prevalent premises promoted in 
climate discourse is the notion that a new treaty must be highly 
inclusive for reasons of procedural fairness and general 
democracy. This premise is proving dated or even outright false. 
While many legal scholars still refer to “all” major emitters, this 
notion denotes the ideal of international inclusiveness that has 
proved unrealistic so far. Respectfully, this Article argues that 
these notions have proved so unpragmatic that they now more 
closely align with idealistic academic myths than on-the-ground 
reality in the climate treaty formulation contexts. This Section 
will analyze the advantages and criticisms pertaining to what has 
become known as “minilateralism” and set forth some examples 
of successful narrow national negotiation constellations work to 
show that minilateralism works in reality. 
As a threshold matter, “multilateralism” denotes the 
creation of international bodies, agreements, and rules through 
negotiation by the states that will be also subject to the 
arrangements in question and who agree to be bound by the 
arrangements.139 “Inclusive” multilateralism happens when 
NGOs are also involved in the discourse140 or simply when an 
extensive number of nations form part of the debate. In 
contrast, “minilateralism” denotes seeking a “magic number” of 
key states with enough influence upon an issue to craft smaller, 
responsive international institutions.141 “Exclusive” 
minilateralism takes place when excluding irrelevant parties and 
all NGO involvement.142 In the climate context, for example, 
exclusive minilateralism would come about by excluding the 175 
or so nations with the least GHG emissions.143 
In general, typical criticisms of exclusive minilateralism 
include the arguments that such processes are self-serving, break 
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ethical principles of due process, directly contest the 
cosmopolitan democratic version of liberal multilateralism and 
“all inclusiveness,” and thus lack legitimacy within the 
international society.144 Openly excluding NGOs from processes 
is contra to the democratic ideal that promotes the voice of non-
state actors for accountability and aggregation of interest 
purposes.145 With climate change in particular, due process 
concerns arise when the most vulnerable nations are excluded 
from the democratic process that would greatly affect them.146 
The stand-off between top emitters would allegedly be the same 
in small forums as in big ones,147 so the argument is that 
negotiators may just as well continue with large-scale multilateral 
negotiations even though they stopped yielding effective results 
about two decades ago,148 incidentally with the creation of the 
UNFCCC and the WTO. Further, smaller groupings are thought 
to bring with them the risk that economically powerful states 
acting more or less alone will redefine the problem and accept 
lower levels of ambition than what is actually needed.149 
Parades of horribles such as these are far from unknown in 
the legal field, and thankfully often prove unwarranted. As 
reality shows, a continued stalemate is more likely to happen 
with the continued use of the same broad constellation. The 
“stand-off” between some emitters could be avoided by smaller 
cooperative forums that, quite simply, excluded disinterested 
nations to begin with. As treaty history shows, this step may in 
itself provide sufficient international “jealousy” to motivate 
them to join the regime in secondary steps. Alternatively, if 
sufficient economic motivators were developed and made 
available to a certain range of parties, this too could break the 
stalemate in small and large forums. The broader concerns 
regarding due process and ethics are, of course, very valid, but it 
is not the first time in history that they have been brought up 
and initially set aside in order to reach agreements on crucial 
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matters, as shown above. In regards to climate change, 
procedural problems are better than substantive stalemate. We 
need a quite different perspective than ever before. “An 
approach based on agreements or partnerships between 
individual nations, groups of countries and regions makes more 
sense—and could eventually strengthen more universal 
measures.”150 
In fact, minilateral forums are already used in UNFCCC 
contexts, as was most recently demonstrated in connection with 
the Copenhagen Conference of Parties 15 (“COP 15”). In an 
attempt to take advantage of its Presidency and become an 
agenda-setting leader, Denmark broke ranks with the traditional 
negotiating parties and, instead, focused its efforts on a group of 
nations known as “the circle of commitment,” which was 
understood to include the United Kingdom, United States, and 
Denmark.151 Discussions were held among these parties outside 
the UNFCCC preparatory meetings in order to garner support 
for the “Danish text.”152 This proposed text would have 
abandoned the Kyoto Protocol, weakened the United Nation’s 
role in handling climate finance by handing effective control of 
climate change finance to the World Bank, made any money to 
help poor countries adapt to climate change dependent on 
them taking a range of actions, forced developing countries to 
agree to specific emission cuts and measures that were not part 
of the original UN agreement, and divided poor countries 
further by creating a new official category of developing 
countries called “the most vulnerable.”153 In addition, Denmark 
also organized bilateral meetings with, among others, the 
European Union, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, China, and 
India, and a multilateral, confidential meeting between twenty 
to thirty countries to advocate for its position prior to the COP 
15.154 However, the Danish text was ultimately leaked to the 
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Guardian,155 which alienated the vast majority of the states that 
had been unaware of the existence of the text.156 The Group of 
77 (“G77”) plus China denounced it as “undemocratic, unfair 
and . . . lack[ing] . . . transparency.”157 No agreement was 
ever reached on the text. Instead, on the Friday before the 
closure of the COP, the leaders of five nations (the United 
States, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil) met in private to 
draft the modest three-page Copenhagen Accord.158 The text of 
this proposed agreement was presented to a group of twenty-six 
countries that had also tried to create an agreement for 
consensus during the last few days of the COP.159 Consensus on 
support for the Accord was reached by these twenty-six nations. 
However, the Copenhagen Accord was ultimately rejected by 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Sudan, and Tuvalu, a rejection 
that was possible because UNFCCC agreements require full 
consensus.160 The Accord was thus only “noted” rather than 
“adopted,”161 although, importantly, subsequent consensus on 
the main aspects of the Accord was reached only one year later 
at the COP 16 in Cancun.162 
The Copenhagen process shows that breakouts are on the 
way within the UNFCCC. Although the Accord cannot be said to 
have had a huge ultimate effect, it was at least a beginning and 
was an indicator of the potential for climate clubs. Noticeably, 
the Accord took its start in confidential agreements among just 
five nations, became further empowered by a group of twenty-
six, and was adopted a year later by approximately 142 
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nations.163 There is thus strong evidence of the willingness of key 
states to marginalize the open development of texts through the 
UNFCCC meetings and instead employ minilateral discourse 
forums.164 
Outside the UNFCCC context, but within MEAs, club 
formation is common too. For example, the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership (“APP”), intended to complement, but not replace, 
the Kyoto Protocol work, commenced with six original nations 
(China, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the United 
States) and has since added two (New Zealand and Canada).165 
The United States Major Emitters and Energy Consumers 
Process (“MEP”) was established to build on US relations within 
the APP and initially consisted of the world’s top fifteen GHG 
economies and polluters.166 These nations were to develop long-
term global goals “based on national circumstances” with the 
goals to be determined by each state individually.167 Thus, clubs 
exist even within clubs. The forum, re-badged by the Obama 
Administration as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and 
Climate (“MEF”) in 2009, comprises seventeen nations. Perhaps 
most promising is the fact that the Montreal Protocol was led by 
three major coalitions: one led by the United States that favored 
a deep agreement, a group comprised of the then-European 
Community and Japan, and a coalition of developing countries 
that shared concerns about potential economic impacts.168 
Outside the MEA context, clubs have been formed for a 
long time as well, and with much success. An example is what is 
now the European Union. The current twenty-eight members 
grouped and integrated at different rates. Even currently, the 
European Union allows for agreements among only some 
members. For example, not all members use the euro; Denmark 
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and the United Kingdom have opted out. Denmark also opted 
out of the common EU defense policy.169 Under the Schengen 
Agreement (which initially was adopted independently of the 
European Union), most EU members and a few non-EU 
members have abolished border controls. 
In international financial law, club formation takes 
precedent in both legally binding and non-binding agreements. 
For example, the WTO has provisions for plurilateral 
agreements that allow small groups of countries to proceed with 
a more limited agreement than others.170 But the WTO also 
employs non-exclusive principles; discussions leading up to 
these agreements may involve non-members as well as members, 
just as membership is open to non-members.171 Likewise, the 
WTO’s “Most Favored Nation” principle started as an 
agreement among a relatively exclusive club, but now extends to 
all members.172 Accordingly, the WTO is, on the one hand, a 
very broadly democratic organization, but on the other hand, 
also features intrinsic club-formation, or at least narrower 
regime constellations in relation to some issues when needed. 
Much could be learned from that in the climate regime. 
On the non-binding end of the spectrum, initial 
multilateral talks within the OECD may also not have been as 
integrative as some prevailing existing theories may suggest.173 
There too were the issues defined and influenced by dominant 
players.174 And the various groups of major economies, such as 
the G8, G8+5, and currently the G20, are also by definition 
exclusive clubs, although they are not driven by internal 
coalitions, but rather reach agreement by all members through 
flexibility, which is key to these groups’ work. 
In short, a small club of key emitters could transform the 
credibility of climate actions and provide a new effective 
alternative to what has been seen as the problem of treaty law, 
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namely that treaties become the “‘law of the least ambitious 
program . . .’ and codify the interests of laggards.”175 
In contrast, the development of the Seal Treaty 
demonstrates the benefits that derive from inclusive and, to 
perhaps a smaller extent, symmetrical bargaining. Each of the 
four major sealing parties to the negotiations was recognized as 
a Great Power, which created some symmetry in the distribution 
of power.176 Unilateral attempts by each state to take advantage 
of the situation (and, for example, exterminate entire herds of 
seals out of spite just to prevent other nations from benefiting 
from the resource) were met with strong responses. In other 
words, the inclusivity meant that the parties were able to keep 
each other in check, although doing so created a very tense 
situation that persisted for decades,177 not unlike the current 
climate change situation. However, the symmetric bargaining 
cannot fully account for the success, as the military powers had 
also begun to shift at the time.178 Perhaps the somewhat equal 
economic status among the parties was more important. But 
with the shift of military status came the resolution of the seal 
issue,179 which may bode well for the development of a new 
climate regime complex as China is rising in both economic and 
thus also military power. Shifts in the balance of power at 
negotiation tables can allow for decisions and outcomes that 
might otherwise have been impossible.180 Similarly, changing 
specific parties in international negotiations either by expansion 
or reduction of the pool of negotiating parties can cause shifts 
in the balance of power181 that may help pave the way towards a 
new agreement. Thus, a reduction of the number of participants 
in the climate change negotiations in clubs or via “tracks” or 
                                                                                                               
175.  See David Victor, Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: 
Numbers, Interests and Institutions, 6 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2006, at 90 (quoting 
ARILD UNDERDAL, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: THE CASE 
OF THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC 36 (1980)). 
176.  See Mirovitskaya, supra note 16, at 36–37. 
177.  Id. 
178.  Mirovitskaya, supra note 16 at 37. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. at 37–38. 
181.  Id. 
412 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:373 
“tiers” may well help break the hopeless stalemate of recent 
years.182 This will be further developed in the next Section. 
G. Tiers, Tracks, and Other Fairness Concerns 
Instead of one major agreement with limited differentiation 
of party obligations among a few tracks of parties, such as the 
design of the first Kyoto Protocol architecture, recent climate 
discourse points to the possibility that a new agreement may well 
have to feature several more layers of obligations. This Section 
will highlight the existing regime and possibilities for its future 
development 
1. CBDR 
Treaties considered successful by experts reflect notions of 
fairness such as the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (“CBDR”) in MEA contexts.183 This principle 
has been promoted in environmental contexts since its 
inception as part of Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development. The Montreal Protocol 
featured exact but differentiated plans for compliance.184 
Developing nations faced looser restrictions and received 
economic assistance.185 The principle was most recently invoked 
by the 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC COP. But the amount of 
differentiation spelled out in the two related instruments 
(“Annex I” and “Annex II” countries under the UNFCC 
umbrella as well as “Annex B” and “non-Annex I” countries 
together with the resulting legal and financial obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol) is no longer considered to give sufficient 
guidance to inform the parties of exactly what is required of 
them.186 More obligation divergence is needed to secure a new, 
fair treaty. The largest emitters must accept that they will likely 
have to show sincere efforts to reduce their emissions to what 
may be seen as a disproportionately greater extent than 
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developing countries and to share technologies to help the 
latter.187 
Of course, notions of what is “fair” differ widely and 
depend on the point of view from which one approaches this 
topic. For example, the United States has so far rejected a 
climate agreement because, at bottom, American negotiators 
have not considered it “fair” that developing nations such as 
China and India have not also had to take on legally binding 
targets. In turn, China and India have taken the stance that 
because their per capita emissions are much lower than those in 
North America, they should not have to be bound to total 
emissions targets. The elephant in the room is that the Sino-
Indian notion may not be so “unfair” after all.188 To reach a 
supranational agreement in a timely fashion, the United States 
may just have to swallow its diplomatic pride, set aside its own 
previous hard stance on this topic, and instead reconsider 
whether it would make more overall sense to display a more 
flexible attitude towards the attempts of China and other rapidly 
emerging countries in reaching overall reductions as well as per 
capita goals. Principles from the Asia-Pacific Partnership context 
demonstrate that much trust may be gained among negotiators 
if members of a group of large emitters showed sincere efforts to 
reduce emissions unilaterally first, especially if some nations 
showed a greater willingness to share technologies and provide 
economic support for the adoption of new technologies in 
poorer member nations.189 It is well established that economic, 
technical, and information-sharing mechanisms to facilitate 
compliance in developing countries are a trademark of good 
international agreements.190 On the other hand, a common fear 
in this context is that less economically able nations simply seek 
to increase their technological prowess “for free” without 
actually reducing their carbon footprints. Further, China’s 
economic growth is, for example, more than double the world’s 
average191 and as China stands to become the largest economy in 
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the world within this decade,192 the question becomes if China is 
or will remain a country that should receive help and how much. 
That question, however, is outside the scope of this Article. 
It may be that the creation of a single, relatively uniform 
treaty text for negotiation reduces the degree of complexity and, 
thus, at least in theory, makes it more likely that a greater 
number of nations will become willing to adopt the text 
compared to treaties that feature a greater amount of flexible 
arrangements. However, single texts are known to result in the 
least common denominator being chosen and reducing the 
opportunities for creativity in shaping the central problem.193 In 
a worst-case scenario, a single uniform text does not reflect the 
central problem at all or the desires of the majority of potential 
participants.194 This became reality with the Kyoto Protocol, the 
first version of which was valid until late 2012, but only called for 
approximately 5% emissions reductions even towards the end of 
the first commitment period when it had become known that 
much deeper cuts were needed. Accordingly, more multi-
faceted agreements are more likely to result in substantively 
better results, especially if nations can form clubs in negotiating 
such tiered agreements. 
2. Tiers and Tracks 
Tiered solutions have proven effective in both 
environmental and non-environmental contexts. The ATS, for 
example, was initially developed as one overall treaty governing 
the territorial and general usage claims, with separate treaties 
for seals, krill, and other living resources adopted afterwards in a 
step-by-step approach featuring separate tracks for the involved 
nations.195 In the creation of the WTO, talks often deadlocked, 
but when the trade-in-services discussions were moved to a 
separate negotiation track, the deadlock was resolved196 and, as 
the saying goes, the rest is history. In the US-Japanese telecom 
agreement, the United States wanted a “critical mass” of 
options, from either a quantity or a quality point of view, to 
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choose from.197 The result was a tiered agreement. “Tier One” 
nations were required to fulfill 100% of their respective market 
opening commitments (the United States, European Union, 
Canada, and Japan “quad,” plus Switzerland, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Brazil, India, and Korea).198 “Tier Two” consisted of 
advanced developing countries (ASEAN, the “Big Latins,” and 
South Africa), who would have to satisfy existing regimes and 
commit to future market opening within reasonable 
timeframes.199 “Tier Three” comprised all remaining countries, 
who would be asked to bind their current regimes.200 In this way, 
the desired critical mass was achieved, although less than seventy 
states were signatories to the resulting agreement.201 Ninety 
percent of the telecommunications market was covered by the 
agreement, which led the United States to commit to open its 
market on a most favored nation basis.202 This shows that 
substantively successful agreements can be reached without the 
extremely broad consensus sought so far under the UNFCCC 
auspices, as long as a certain minimum number of key nations 
form a part. 
The tiered approach already applies to some MEAs such as 
the United States-Canada Quality Agreement and the Long-
range Transboundary Air Pollution Regime.203 The latter has 
separate protocols on separate substances such as sulfur dioxide, 
mono-nitrogen oxides, and heavy metals.204 Track solutions 
might be possible in a renewed climate change regime. In fact, 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol already feature both de jure 
and de facto tracks205: de jure, these frameworks already 
reference Annex I, non-Annex I, and Annex II solutions; de 
facto, parties have taken technology-based initiatives, made 
subnational commitments and initiated much other cooperation 
outside the UNFCCC/Kyoto context. Future tracks or tiers 
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could consist of a host of different commitments such as 
completely individualized commitments, integrated 
commitments with a limited number of tracks and requirements 
as to which nations could negotiate within which tracks, a 
variable approach including both legally binding and non-
legally binding targets, or economy-wide vs. sector-wide 
commitments.206 A “menu” approach has also been suggested, 
under which nations are limited to a choice of options from a 
collectively agreed-upon menu.207 Finally, a “mixed approach” 
would define some commitments collectively via a top-down 
supranational approach, but letting nations define others by 
themselves in a bottom-up fashion.208 At bottom, it is clear that 
the major economies are more apt to engage in an international 
effort if given latitude to pursue different policy tracks.209 For 
example, “Todd Stern, U.S. special envoy for climate change, 
said the U.S. position of having nations offer up their own 
‘nationally determined mitigation commitments’ – one that was 
greeted with some skepticism at the 2009 Copenhagen summit – 
has now become accepted wisdom among key blocs from China 
to the European Union.”210 
The view that a new climate treaty must be able to 
accommodate a greater degree of changes without having to 
renegotiate the treaty in a few years is supported by Christiana 
Figueres, executive secretary of the UNFCCC: “there is no 
appetite to renegotiate yet another agreement in two [to] five 
years . . . . What the governments want is something they can 
add on to, in sort of a modular fashion, as time moves on.”211 
Whether the diversity of obligation required is called club 
formation, tiers, tracks, or something else, it is clear that the 
time has come to utilize negotiation techniques that allow for 
much greater diversity and flexibility than what has been used 
under the UNFCCC so far. And whatever obligations are 
adopted, they must be legally binding in order to be successful; 
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merely drafting treaties means little on-the-ground improvement 
without binding effect and enforcement options.212 Although a 
legally binding solution is arguably key to climate change in 
order to be able to provide sufficiently serious deterrents to this 
increasingly severe factual problem, non-binding agreements 
can similarly play an important complementary role in the initial 
stages of treaty drafting.213 Such agreement would not work as 
much as leaders of action but as codifiers214: “International 
cooperation emerges through ambitious commitments, efforts 
and experiments that are undertaken more readily when 
agreements are nonbinding. Through these experiments, 
governments gain confidence . . . and then become more 
willing to embrace binding commitments.”215 For example, the 
European acid rain regime was adopted alongside a binding 
convention.216 The US-Japanese telecom agreement process also 
shows that alternative forums are valuable to eventual binding 
results. Human rights treaties demonstrate this: numerous 
nations around the world have adopted a wide range of such 
instruments, yet continue their flagrant violations thereof. It 
may be advantageous for nations to accede to various treaties 
from a publicity standpoint, but without legal “teeth,” a treaty 
does not guarantee any actual action. And in order to avoid a 
race to the bottom in the MEA context, a climate treaty must 
require that more be done to protect the environment than states 
would otherwise be inclined to do.217 
Creating a treaty is a difficult art and science. The above 
demonstrates some of the most important factors that come into 
play when nations attempt to do so. The next Section will 
analyze who should do so. 
II. MINILATERAL CONSTELLATIONS IN THE CLIMATE 
CHANGE REGIME COMPLEX; THE “WHO” 
Recent scholarship proposes that a new climate change 
agreement is likely to be created by a much narrower 
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constellation of parties than previously envisioned, although 
most writers continue to promote the inclusion of “all” major 
emitters. Typical suggestions range from twelve to twenty parties. 
Why do many scholars and policymakers now seem to agree that 
not all or even most nations around the world are needed for a 
successful new climate treaty when the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol comprised almost two hundred nations? The answer is 
that because most emissions are created by a relatively low 
number of nations, only a minority of nations is needed for 
substantive success. As one leading analyst said, “it is better to 
focus on [the twenty largest] emitters, the other 150 countries 
only get in the way.”218 
This Section first examines recent proposals for action-
taking clubs. The Article analyzes who that is and what these 
nations themselves indicate about their possible intent to take 
action (or the lack thereof). The Section then critically 
examines which nations are the most realistic candidates for a 
renewed climate change regime complex constellation. 
A. Frequently Proposed Constellations 
The smallest number proposed for a renewed climate 
regime is three: the United States, the European Union, and 
China.219 Each of these is responsible for a high proportion of 
global carbon emissions (at least 12%) and of global GDP.220 
Together, they represent half of the global GDP and 49% of 
global carbon emissions.221 Because they also possess important 
technological and human capital for decarbonizing the 
economy, in addition to relatively solid finances, these nations 
are seen as particularly important players.222 In fact, they are 
arguably so important to the climate context that they could 
constitute a successful constellation by themselves—if not 
substantively, then at least to spur further nations to join the 
club or emulate its action. 
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India, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil are also 
considered to be potentially important to the formulation of a 
new climate treaty.223 India’s share of total emissions is growing 
rapidly and, in this decade, will likely surpass the emissions of 
the European Union and the United States.224 Brazil has the 
least carbon-intensive energy matrix225 of these nations and is 
thus of much recent scholarly and political interest. Japan has 
one of the less-intensive carbon economies of the world, and in 
addition has strong human and technological capacity for the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.226 South Korea is similarly 
highly resource-capable and is very reform-minded.227 Russia is 
among the most difficult nations in the climate debate as it has 
very high per capita emissions and actually stands to benefit 
economically from climate change.228 This is so because warmer 
temperatures in Russia would mean an increased grain output 
and savings on heating costs, further explained below. But, as 
shown above, Russia has historically played a large role on the 
international scene. It could be that a solution that excludes 
Russia is not internationally acceptable. 
The so-called “k group”—the minimum number of 
countries necessary to make collective action rational within 
climate change—is often said to be “about a dozen,” namely the 
top ten emitters from fossil fuel usage plus Brazil and Indonesia; 
two of the top emitters from changes in land use.229 Twelve—
incidentally also the size of most juries—is a number that many 
“deliberative democrats argue is the optimal size for meaningful 
deliberation.”230 Who would these be? The group should, 
according to one theory, be comprised of “the most capable, the 
most responsible and the most vulnerable.”231 
The most capable are the leading developed economies 
(using GDP as a proxy for capacity), which have the greatest 
capacity to reduce emissions through technological innovation, 
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and the greatest capacity to assist developing countries with 
mitigation and adaption. The most responsible are the parties 
with the biggest historical, aggregate, and forecasted emissions, 
and therefore the biggest scope to reduce emissions, with 
appropriate acknowledgement of differences in per capita 
emissions and development need. The most vulnerable are the 
parties that are expected to suffer the harshest impacts of 
climate change, and have the least capacity to adapt. The most 
vulnerable are represented by three key negotiating blocs: the 
Alliance of Small Island States (“AOSIS”), the African Group 
(“AG”), and the Least Developed Countries (“LDC”).232 
A group consisting of the United States, the European 
Union, the AG, the Russian Federation, Japan, China, India, 
Brazil, Korea, Mexico, AOSIS, and the LDCs has thus been 
suggested because this would precisely capture the most 
responsible, the most capable, and the most vulnerable by 
including approximately 70% of total emissions as well as 70% of 
the world population.233 Others have even gone further. Most 
still promote “all major emitters,”234 which by most accounts 
would amount to as many as approximately fifteen to twenty 
parties.235 
A few years ago, a highly influential article proclaimed that 
the “magic number” that can break the world’s untenable 
gridlock is “about twenty;” namely, the world’s twenty most 
polluting nations.236 Yet others suggest action within already 
existing architectures such as the MEF, G20, APP, OECD, the 
WTO, and even the United Nations Security Council. The 
number of parties of a climate agreement under the auspices of 
these groups would supposedly be coterminous with their 
general membership. The relevance of these architectures to the 
climate change discourse is analyzed below. 
Some experts list criteria for membership, not actual 
numbers. For example, one source promotes a club consisting 
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of “all [the] major current and future emitters and participants 
who have the firm political will to act swiftly to achieve the 2°C 
goal and a common vision on how to achieve this,” 237 but 
recognizes that no venue or group of nations currently fulfills all 
these criteria. Precisely for that reason we must stop the rhetoric 
that perpetually and almost stubbornly promotes ideas that are 
academically appealing, but practically unrealistic. Whatever the 
exact number, this much is clear: much could be accomplished 
by focusing more on the true climate change culprits rather 
than making everyone pay the price for a problem 
predominantly caused by only a few handfuls of states. Further, 
only a limited number of states have the actual capability to 
pioneer the technological innovation relevant to climate 
change.238 A pragmatic solution with many fewer participants 
than what is currently promoted in academic circles is 
warranted. 
Exactly who are the “major emitters” so frequently referred 
to in the climate discourse? This will be examined next. 
B. The World’s Current Top Twenty Emitters 
The following were the world’s top twenty emitters in 2010 
measured in million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(“MtCO2e”).239 The total global amount of MtCO2e was 
44,542.240 
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Rank Country Total GHG 
emissions 
excluding land-
use change and 
forest activities 
(“LUCFs”) (in 
MtCO2e)
Total GHG 
emissions 
including 
LUCFs (in 
MtCO2e) 
Percent of 
world 
total 
(without 
LCUFs) 
1 China 10,385 10,081 23% 
2 USA 6,866 6,775 15% 
3 EU (27) 4,918 4,823 11% 
4 India 2,326 2,304 5% 
5 Russia 2,326 2,317 5% 
6 Brazil 1,162 2,136 3% 
7 Germany 926 926 2% 
8 Indonesia 823 1,170 2% 
9 Iran 727 727 2% 
10 Canada 726 726 2% 
11 Mexico 688 706 2% 
12 South 
Korea 
678 679 2% 
13 United 
Kingdom 
627 626 1% 
14 Australia 587 736 1% 
15 South 
Africa 
560 560 1% 
16 France 545 532 1% 
17 Saudi 
Arabia 
542 542 1% 
18 Italy 515 497 1% 
19 Spain 408 393 1% 
20 Ukraine 390 383 1% 
 Top ten 
total 
  70% 
 Top twenty 
total 
  82% 
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Developing nations account for 60% of total global GHG 
emissions.241 
C. National Standpoints on International Climate Change Action 
One thing is what we as scholars think “should” be done at 
the supranational level. Quite another is what nations are 
actually willing to do. Thankfully, a turning point in the rhetoric 
among some key parties in relation to their national and 
international commitments gives reason for optimism that some 
parties will finally agree on effective action against climate 
change. So what do some of the most relevant nations themselves 
have to say about their stance on this issue? In the following, the 
stance of, for brevity, the five currently largest emitters is 
analyzed. 
1. The United States 
So far, the United States has never ratified any 
internationally legally binding climate change agreement.242 In 
2009, President Obama “pledged” to reduce the total US 
emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.243 The target was 
not ratified by the Senate.244 The country is, however, 
approximately halfway to meeting this target.245 
In the summer of 2013, President Obama announced his 
domestic Climate Action Plan (“Action Plan”), which also gave 
several indications of what may be expected from the United 
States in relation to international climate change efforts. Among 
other things, the President called for “multilateral engagement” 
on climate change and promised to “lead international efforts” 
to combat the threat of climate change.246 The United States 
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“commit[ed] to expanding major new and existing international 
initiatives including bilateral initiatives with China, India and 
other major emitting countries.”247 The United States’ promise 
to push for a global climate treaty in negotiations under the 
UNFCCC.248 Accordingly, in a speech announcing the 
publication of the Climate Action Plan, President Obama stated 
that: 
Four years ago, in Copenhagen, every major country agreed, 
for the first time, to limit carbon pollution by 2020. Two 
years ago, we decided to forge a new agreement beyond 2020 
that would apply to all countries, not just developed countries. 
What we need is an agreement that’s ambitious—because 
that’s what the scale of the challenge demands. We need an 
inclusive agreement—because every country has to play its 
part. And we need an agreement that’s flexible—because 
different nations have different needs.249 
Of course, the US Senate would have to advise and consent 
to American participation in an international climate change 
treaty. With the persistent Congressional gridlock in relation to 
a wide range of issues, it may be that the President’s above 
statements are simply an expression of hope in an attempt to 
give direction of what truly should happen rather than what is 
actually likely to happen. This is especially troublesome given 
the fact that the new treaty has been slated to take effect in 2015, 
mere months away. Further, the President also disappointed 
some environmentalists with his January 2014 State of the Union 
address in which he touted his “all-of-the-above” energy strategy, 
which includes “oil and natural gas production.”250 As has been 
said, “[i]t is time to implement a different strategy focused on 
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developing the ‘best of the above:’ solar, wind, renewables.”251 
On the other hand, although federal climate legislation 
collapsed in the Senate in 2010 and although the Senate 
currently also appears unwilling to adopt a climate treaty, one 
can hope that the string of severe weather events of recent 
months in combination with the amount of sound economic 
and scientific information calling for climate change action 
could cause a watershed either under the current administration 
or shortly thereafter. A tipping-point effect could happen 
among US lawmakers, even though political interests 
unfortunately still seem too solidly entrenched to facilitate 
Senate treaty ratification in the near future. 
As for who the United States sees as crucial members of a 
possible new agreement and how inclusive a new agreement may 
have to be, President Obama has previously refused to agree to 
any solution that does not include China and India.252 The 
Action Plan laments the fact that these two parties, as well as 
“Brazil and other emerging economies,” did not have binding 
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.253 The Plan also cites the 
fact that at the 2009 Copenhagen COP 15, “President Obama 
and other world leaders agreed for the first time that all major 
countries, whether developing or not, would implement targets 
or actions to limit greenhouse emissions.”254 This is a positive. 
Emerging economies are considered unlikely to join a new 
climate regime if they do not believe that the historically largest 
polluters will shoulder the majority of the burden.255 As for the 
American call for what appears to be a very broad agreement 
(“every country has to play its part”), time will have to tell 
whether the United States will be unwilling to accept a less 
inclusive agreement or whether the above is a rhetorical starting 
position for the upcoming international negotiations, which 
sophisticated negotiators know will have to include a certain 
amount of compromise. 
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In early part of 2013, the United States reached what is seen 
by the President and others as a crucial agreement with China to 
jointly phase down the nations’ production and consumption of 
hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”).256 The reduction of HFCs is 
crucial to climate change mitigation and thus potentially a good 
sign for future mutual agreement between these two nations. As 
noted by King: 
This is not a historic climate deal that will prevent the world 
from smashing 2°C warming, nor will it lay the foundations 
for long-term low carbon growth. [But the] agreement does 
allow both countries to say they are taking dynamic and firm 
action to address the causes of climate change—which isn’t 
strictly accurate—and leverage control at UN talks crying 
out for national leadership.257 
Although not a groundbreaking agreement from a 
substantive point of view, the US–China HFC deal does indicate 
that these nations’ current negotiators are able to reach 
consensus and close an important deal, which is at least 
somewhat promising from a procedural point of view and an 
improvement on the previous complete inaction in bilateral 
MEAs between these two nations. But of course, more than mere 
rhetoric is needed, and time will have to tell if this can be 
obtained. The “on-again, off-again” nature of climate change 
talks between the United States and China is cause for some 
concern as to the true intent of these two nations. Nonetheless, 
hope must be maintained that they can, soon, come to an 
agreement in this area. 
2. China 
The Twelfth Chinese Five-Year Plan of 2011 sets binding 
targets to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16%, 
cut CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 17%, and raise the 
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proportion of non-fossil fuels in the overall primary energy mix 
to 11.4%.258 Although China was the biggest CO2 polluter in 
2012, the nation “still posted one of its lowest increases in a 
decade, thanks to efforts on renewables deployment and 
efficiency gains.”259 China is planning emissions caps for existing 
and new industrial facilities in forty-seven major cities in 
nineteen provinces,260 and has made progress toward reducing 
its overall emissions.261 
Internationally, China officially maintains its position of not 
undertaking any total emissions reductions, but rather only GPD-
bound commitments. As for the Chinese position on 
international obligations, China maintains that “rich nations” 
“should become part[ies] to an extended Kyoto Protocol—an 
emissions deal for some industrialized countries that the 
Americans long ago rejected—or at least make ‘comparable 
mitigation commitments.’”262 Not surprisingly, China promotes 
the principle of CBDR.263 
According to Lord Stern, “[l]eadership from US and China 
is absolutely fundamental.”264 This is so because together, the 
two nations account for a very large share of the global CO 
emissions (close to or, in one estimate, more than 40% of CO2 
emissions).265 In April 2013, China and the USA increased 
cooperation significantly in a Climate Change Working Group 
aimed at taking “forceful” action against climate change.266 In a 
joint statement, the nations agreed that they realize that climate 
change “threatens our economic livelihoods and our security” 
and that they have thus “elevated this issue in our bilateral 
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relationship.”267 Because China has previously been very 
recalcitrant towards binding climate change action, this marks a 
“big initial step” forward on climate action.268 During COP 19 
UNFCCCC negotiations, China and India sought use of the 
phrase “actions” which suggests less binding action than 
“commitments,” which the United States and European Union 
preferred.269 The parties reached a compromise agreement 
using the term “contributions.” Although not overly promising, 
it is at least an improvement over previous Chinese 
unwillingness to adopt any language indicating any type of 
legally binding requirements. This move in the right direction 
may have a desirable ripple effect as India has also indicated its 
willingness to be flexible, while Brazil has taken the cue from 
China.270 Crucially, experts predict that “[o]ther holdouts will 
jump on” and that an eventual international agreement can be 
reached.271 
Although executive agencies do not speak for the 
international intent of their national governments, both the 
State Environmental Protection Agency of China and the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency have also indicated the 
potential for what may come as follows: 
The goal of [a 2012] joint United States (U.S.) and China 
strategy is to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative efforts 
to reduce the emissions intensity (air pollution and 
greenhouse gases) of China’s rapidly growing economy. 
Implementation of the joint strategy is intended to address 
China’s severe local and regional air pollution problems 
and reduce emissions that contribute to transboundary air 
pollution, as well as regional and global climate impacts.272 
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Of course, the concern remains whether sufficient and 
legally binding action is likely to be forthcoming from China or 
whether the nation is, in fact, continuing to stall progress with 
empty rhetoric. The same could, however, be said for the United 
States. But hopefully these two parties will, in the nick of time, 
realize the advantages of and necessity for mutually binding 
action on climate change. 
3. The European Union 
The European Union’s current legally binding goal is for 
the region to reach 20% GHG reductions from 1990 levels by 
2020, a 20% share of total energy for renewable energy, and 
voluntary target to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020—
the so-called “20 by 20”.273 The European Union has 
additionally offered to increase its emissions reduction to thirty 
percent by 2020 if other major emitting countries in the 
developed and developing worlds commit to undertake their 
“fair share” of a global emissions reduction effort.274 For the 
long term, EU leaders have endorsed the “objective” of 
reducing Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions by 80–95% 
compared to 1990 levels by 2050 as part of efforts by developed 
countries as a group to reduce their emissions. 275 A potential 
new goal of 40% reduction by 2030 has been announced, which 
would be consistent with an aim for the bloc to cut emissions 
80–95% by 2050.276 However, this goal is an overall regional goal 
that does not impose national targets. Some consider this “likely 
to be much harder to enforce.”277 The European Parliament is 
likely to proceed on this issue after elections in May 2014.278 The 
European Union is on track towards meeting its targets for 
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2020.279 EU emissions recently fell partly due to contracting 
economies, but also due to extensive renewable energy usage.280 
Supranationally and regionally, the European Union is 
pressing for an agreement that is “ambitious, comprehensive 
and legally binding.”281 According to Climate Action 
Commissioner Connie Hedegaard: “The direction for Europe 
has been set. If all other regions were equally ambitious about 
tackling climate change, the world would be in significantly 
better shape.”282 The European Union is not asking developing 
nations to commit to absolute emission reductions, but makes it 
known that they would be expected to begin reducing their 
growth of emissions, and to commit to emissions reductions 
after 2020.283 According to the Union, all major developing 
countries should commit to reductions of 50% over 1990 levels 
by 2050.284 Emerging economies must form part of a new 
agreement and are unlikely to buy into a new set of targets if left 
out of the conversation.285 But this does not mean that the 
heaviest part of the burden will not have to be pulled by the 
developed world. 
4. India 
India’s stance on both national and international climate 
change efforts is outdated and unimpressive, although the 
nation has made some progress toward reducing national 
emissions.286 In 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh released 
India’s first National Action Plan on Climate Change outlining 
existing and future policies and programs addressing climate 
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mitigation and adaptation. 287 The plan identifies eight core 
“national missions” running through 2017.288 Only the eighth 
addresses international action involving India, but still only 
references a “knowledge group” working with the global 
community in research and technology development by 
collaboration through “different mechanisms.” India has stated 
that it “[w]ill meet our obligations under the UNFCCC,”289 
which, however, included no exact or legally binding 
commitments on the nation. India continually invokes the 
CBDR principle and has issued no promising international 
action indicators recently. 
5. Russia 
The Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation (the 
“Doctrine”) represents Russia’s public policy on climate change 
both within national borders and the international arena.290 
Russia recognizes climate change as a security threat and 
“focuses its efforts on lowering [] anthropogenic GHG 
emissions,”291 but mentions no hard numbers. Instead, the 
Doctrine vaguely cites to the “necessity to take climate change 
into consideration as one of the major long-term elements of 
the security of the Russian Federation and to put the problem of 
global climate change, both in its national and international 
dimensions, among the Russian Federation’s policy 
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priorities.”292 As for international action, the Doctrine only 
recognizes the need for “international equal partnership actions 
of the Russian Federation in the framework of international . . 
. projects concerning climate change.”293 
In December 2012, a presidential order called for the 
creation of an “interdepartmental taskforce on issues of climate 
change and sustainable development.”294 At its first meeting in 
2013, the task force “looked into issues of interdepartmental 
cooperation in implementing the decisions of the [COP 18 in 
Doha in 2012] as well as possible measures for stimulating the 
reduction of man-made greenhouse gas emissions in the Russian 
Federation.”295 The COP 18 extended the Kyoto Protocol until 
2020, but limited it to only the European Union and eight other 
industrialized nations that signed up for binding emissions cuts 
by 2020.296 These represent about 15% of global emissions.297 
The temporary agreement suffers from the lack of participation 
of key industrialized nations and emerging nations such as, 
among others, Russia. During the negotiations, Russia also 
appeared to attempt to stall progress by calling into question the 
voting rules. Russia insists on the continuation of consensus 
voting, which is not a good sign for climate action under the 
UNFCCC umbrella, at least until smaller, yet procedurally 
effective, clubs are formed. That would make it easier to reach 
the consensus insisted upon by Russia, unless by “consensus” 
Russia means by all current UNFCCC parties. Unfortunately, this 
may be the case. 
The most significant problem in relation to Russia’s interest 
in taking action against climate change is probably that the 
nation does not see climate change as purely a negative, in fact, 
quite the opposite: Russia’s Climate Change Doctrine—only 
four years old—lists seven negative effects of climate change, but 
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also four positives.298 Additionally, Russia relies on its better 
ability to adapt to climate change “compared with many other 
countries and regions of the world” because of its vast territory, 
substantial water resources, and relatively low population in 
areas particularly vulnerable to climate change.299 
The above unfortunately indicates that Russia is unwilling 
to take imminent and internationally binding action against 
climate change. The advantage of a narrowed regime complex is 
that other nations can still forge a viable new agreement even 
without Russia. After all, the nation only accounts for 5% of 
global emissions. For sure, the democratically best solution 
would be for Russia to form part of a new climate agreement, 
but there is no need not to go ahead just because of Russia’s 
persistent and egotistical “bad boy” behavior towards climate 
mitigation. 
D. New Constellation Options 
Who, then, are the actors that are the most likely to agree 
on joint action that would be at least somewhat effectual from a 
scientific point of view, but more importantly, likely to spur even 
further international agreement? 
1. The Magic Number is Three 
Parties that are considered key to the substantive issue at 
hand are also widely considered procedurally necessary to its 
solution.300 The United States is very widely considered one of 
the major parties—if not the key party—in the climate change 
context. The United States is the world’s historically largest 
emitter, the world’s largest economy and, quite simply, a key 
player in a great variety of international contexts. The United 
States played key roles in the development of the Atlantic Treaty 
System, the North Atlantic Fur Seal Treaty, the Montreal 
Protocol, and, of course, in the US-Japan telecom agreement. It 
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was among the founding members of the WTO, OECD, and the 
G6, which morphed into the G7, G8, G8+5, and now the G20. It 
is indeed unthinkable that a new climate treaty would exclude 
the United States and still be considered supranationally 
successful. Fortunately, the US President has finally indicated an 
interest in joining an international regime complex, as shown 
above. 
In international discussions, China is approaching the same 
level of importance as the United States in the development of a 
new climate agreement or even surpassing it. As shown, the 
United States continually refers to China in its rhetoric 
pertaining to the parties necessary for the adoption of an 
agreement. As demonstrated, Sino-American relations in climate 
change contexts, specifically the important new HFC agreement, 
have been improving. There are grounds for cautious optimism 
that these two key nations will be able to agree on some climate 
change action in the not too distant future, although US-Sino 
relationships outside the climate context still appear to be 
volatile and unpredictable. Treaty-making precedent clearly 
shows that once bilateral action is taken, this typically spreads 
progressively to multilateral action. This is exactly what is 
needed in the current climate context. 
As for India, not much, if anything, indicates that India is 
capable of or willing to join any kind of international treaty 
regime any time soon. This is unfortunate, but is India a crucial 
party? The United States often refers to the nation in statements 
regarding the new climate regime complex, but does that 
necessarily mean that the United States would not adopt a new 
agreement just because India was not a party if, for example, the 
European Union, China, Brazil, or other important parties 
joined a new regime? That question must be answered elsewhere 
or by history, but this much is sure: the United States is currently 
still bargaining from a position that includes India. However, as 
a sophisticated and highly experienced party to international 
negotiations and compromises, the United States may well agree 
to leave India out of a future agreement if other key emerging 
economies joined. 
One such party could be Brazil. In the energy and climate 
contexts, this country presents several unique conundrums: 
more than 45% of Brazil’s energy comes from renewable 
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sources, compared to only 6.7% for OECD countries.301 Between 
2005 and 2009, Brazil was able to reduce its GHG emissions by 
approximately 25%; the largest reduction ever recorded and 
mainly due to a remarkable fall in Amazonian deforestation.302 
Brazil is ranked one of the five countries with the largest 
potential to reduce emissions by 2030.303 But Brazil is becoming 
increasingly carbonized and is the only important economy in 
the world in which there has been a recent increase in carbon 
intensity if deforestation is not taken into account.304 
Brazil has so far considered climate change to be primarily 
an international relations and not a domestic issue.305 This 
helped divert attention from other pressing issues such as local 
land distribution and use issues.306 But climate change has 
gained much political ground and is now central to the modern 
Brazilian political context.307 Most notably, law number 12.187 
from 2010 adopts Brazil’s voluntary national greenhouse gas 
reduction target of between 36.1% and 38.9% of projected 
emissions by 2020 with a baseline of 2005.308 Another aim is to 
reduce the rate of de-forestation by 70% by 2017, which would 
decrease greenhouse gas emissions by 4.8 billion tons.309 In the 
international context, Brazil endorses the 2°C goal, supports 
CBDR, and has traditionally opposed binding reductions targets 
for non-Annex I countries including major emerging 
economies, at least until 2020.310 Instead, Brazil has suggested 
that only industrialized countries agree to reduce emissions by 
40% by 2020.311 However, Brazil has recently been pushing in 
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favor of some kind of commitments from non-Annex 1 countries 
starting in 2020.312 In the UN context, Brazil has so far 
negotiated in an alliance with emerging countries with an 
energy matrix heavily dependent on fossil fuels (South Africa, 
India, and China, the so-called “BASIC” alliance).313 But 
importantly, “Brazil . . . [is] trying to diminish the distance 
between the position of the European Union and the other 
BASIC countries, particularly trying to persuade China and 
India of the need to be more flexible and trying to make the 
American position more flexible.”314 The real issue is thus, 
for how long [] Brazil [will] maintain the recently created 
imbalance between the domestic climate change policy with 
reduction targets and the alliance with the more 
conservative emerging powers like China, Russia and India. 
Given the interests and relative power of different economic 
sectors and the dynamics of the public opinion, it is 
probable that this imbalance will not last long, and the 
Brazilian position will tend to converge with the more 
advanced EU, Japan and South Korea.315 
The European Union consistently positions itself as in favor 
of multilateralism, international law, and binding international 
obligations.316 Accordingly, it heavily promotes far-reaching, 
international measures to combat climate change and has 
consistently done so for some time. There exists a marked EU 
“desire [for] . . . the creation of an ‘elite-driven, treaty-based, 
legal order,’ a supranational political entity dedicated to respect 
for human rights and the rule of law.”317 Modernly, human 
rights are considered to comprise environmental law and rights 
as well.318 It is, in short, clear that the European Union remains 
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a strong advocate of a treaty-based solution to climate change.319 
For these and other reasons, the European Union is arguably 
the most serious and also one of the world’s most crucial parties 
to the adoption of a legally binding international solution. All 
indicators point towards the European Union’s willingness to be 
flexible in the upcoming work to be done and to adopt, if not 
just “any” international solution, then certainly one with a range 
of different constellation options, as long as these included 
substantively effective goals. 
Although the United States and the European Union still 
have some differences regarding the size of the GHG emissions 
reductions goals required for an effective solution, who should 
undertake these, which of the emerging economies should form 
part of a possibly renewed agreement, and what funding should 
be provided to these, there can be no serious dispute that if a 
breakthrough happened in relation to, most crucially, the 
Chinese position on climate change, the European Union and 
the United States would most likely be able to come together on 
these issues. Both parties have serious international clout. 
Examples abound of their mutual cooperation in many other 
financial, scientific, technical, and territorial contexts. They 
would, in all likelihood, be able to agree on climate change as 
well. 
Thus, a minilateral constellation for a new climate change 
regime could look like this: the United States is a necessary key 
player. But even without the United States, the European Union 
will very likely join a new treaty. Both the United States and the 
European Union call for the inclusion of at least some players 
from the Global South that are willing and able to undertake at 
least some legally binding action. China seems to be the party 
that the United States and European Union most frequently 
have in mind, and has indeed very recently indicated some 
willingness to proceed with an agreement with at least the 
United States, albeit the extent of these intentions still remains 
unclear at this late stage. However, a trilateral union may not be 
sufficiently broad for the United States and European Union; 
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the world’s de facto drivers of action. Historical treaty contexts 
and climate negotiations show that at least one more major 
emerging economy may be required. This could be India or 
Russia, but they both appear unwilling to take any legally 
binding and substantively effective action anytime soon. Thus, 
“new kid on the block” Brazil could soon overtake the previous 
relevance of these two nations in this context. Indeed, Brazil 
itself now promotes commitments by developing nations and is 
shifting its negotiation position towards a closer alliance with the 
European Union and the United States, which is highly 
promising. With Brazil and hopefully other parties, a landslide 
could finally occur in supranational negotiations. 
Accordingly, the “magic number”—to recall, “the smallest 
possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible 
impact on solving a particular problem” or at least instigating 
crucial action towards a resolution—is, in the climate change 
context, three: the United States, the European Union, and 
China. This constellation would account for 49% of the world’s 
total GHG emissions. And with Brazil as an increasingly likely 
fourth player, 52% of global GHGs would be accounted for. 
Scientifically, this is arguably not a high enough percentage to 
solve the ultimate problem, but as the above analyses show, 
broader multilateral action can be derived progressively from 
narrower beginnings, so even a coalition of “just” three or four 
initial parties may be enough. For example, in the case of the 
Seal Treaty, four major economic and population powerhouses 
who used and financially benefitted from the disputed resource 
were enough for a successful resolution. Of course, differences 
between the two situations exist, but this much is clear: 
international agreements start somewhere. So far, the 
international community has gained literally nothing from 
attempting the broadest possible solution; near-global treaty 
participation. It may well be that Denmark, after all, had a good 
point in its 2009 Copenhagen “Danish Solution” to narrow the 
constellation of participating countries very significantly and to 
seek entirely new commitment and financing solutions. But 
where that solution went wrong was that it did not include the 
truly key parties, but rather only included the United States, the 
European Union, and Denmark itself. Such a constellation will 
not work. The above one will. 
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Some have mentioned the possibility of the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council forming a climate 
coalition. Advantageously, this would include the major climate 
powerhouses of Russia, the United States, and China. Such a 
coalition could also advantageously include some developing 
nations. But France and the United Kingdom—the other 
Security Council members—would likely negotiate not 
individually, but from an EU platform. Thus, a solution taking 
its starting point in a Security Council membership is more 
likely to include the United States, Russia, China, and the 
European Union; in other words, again a narrow solution of a 
small handful of parties. However, a Security Council 
background is of mainly academic interest, as will be analyzed 
below. 
2. Jury-sized Options 
Recall that twelve is a number that is thought to be ideal for 
meaningful democratic discussion. Recall also that climate 
rhetoric frequently mentions “the major emitters” by referring 
to, typically, the ten to twelve nations with the highest GHG 
emissions. Would a twelve-party solution work? The top twelve 
nations would include parties currently very willing to take 
decisive action (the European Union), but also some who are 
very likely not (India, perhaps Russia). Additionally, it would 
include parties among whom some current geopolitical friction 
exists (the United States, Russia, and Iran). But as the ATS 
demonstrated, agreements on even highly contested issues 
among rivaling powerhouses can be reached, even in volatile 
times. The ATS also started with just twelve parties and grew 
from there. By applying the tactics and theories analyzed above, 
it could happen again. The top twelve GHG emitters account for 
a total of 74% of the world’s emissions. It is tempting to think 
“the more, the better,” but such rhetoric brings with it the 
problems described above. 
Incidentally, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (“OPEC”) also consists of twelve members. What 
about calling for them to reach an agreement? After all, oil and 
gas are major physical sources of the problem itself, so maybe it 
would not be too much to trace a solution to the actual source 
in a sort of “strict liability”-based solution. But the organization 
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consists of nations that are neither committed to climate action 
nor among the major emitters from a current or historical 
perspective, which makes this idea unviable. 
In some jurisdictions, juries consist of just six members. The 
top six nations in the climate context—China, United States, 
European Union, India, Russia, Brazil, and Germany—account 
for 62% of the problem. However, it is arguably better to base 
rhetoric on who is the most likely to join an agreement that will 
have at least some scientific substance to it from the beginning, 
and, more importantly, that will kick start a situation of broader 
minilateral constellations or progressive multilateralism rather 
than simply pick a random number from the top down. 
3. Tracks 
At bottom, “track” or “tier” solutions simply denote clubs 
of nations agreeing on certain issues. As mentioned, excellent 
scholarship already explores such tracks. In this context, it is 
important to apply a pragmatic approach and examine which 
options are the most likely to be adopted and lead to further 
steps or emulation by others, not to discuss who “should” do 
what. A possible constellation could include the European 
Union, AOSIS, the LDC, and the African Group as one whose 
members are the most capable, the most vulnerable, and, as a 
new very important consideration, the most willing to take 
action (the European Union). Another could cover the United 
States, European Union, Canada, and Australia as the most 
capable and most responsible. However, that constellation 
would comprise no developing nations and is thus problematic. 
A group consisting of the European Union, China, India, Brazil, 
and the LDC would include what are currently the most 
responsible and the most vulnerable, but that constellation does 
not include the United States and is thus unlikely to make a 
deep enough impact substantively and, in particular, 
procedurally. 
In theory, constellation options abound. At the end of the 
day, the crux of the matter is to find workable solutions among 
just enough nations that will pave the way for others to join for a 
variety of pragmatic, not scholarly, reasons. 
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III. IS THE UNFCCC STILL “THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN”?; 
THE “WHERE” 
After the lackluster Copenhagen COP 15 outcome, and 
even before, a wide range of different negotiating platforms and 
governance architectures have been proposed for future climate 
change efforts. In addition to the UNFCCC, these typically 
include the G20, WTO, OECD, the UN Security Council, and 
even the UN General Assembly. The most relevant of these is 
arguably still the UNFCCC, occasionally referred to as the “only 
game in town.”320 This Section will briefly demonstrate the 
advantages of using this architecture and the supranational 
consensus that supports doing so before proceeding to an 
analysis of the relevance of some other forums that may 
complement the UNFCCC. 
A. The UNFCCC; Back to the Future 
The many advantages of using the UNFCCC umbrella 
cannot be denied. First, there is arguably no reason to waste 
precious resources in creating new content from scratch when 
an existing global framework for action already exists.321 The 
UNFCCC already has a staff of five hundred and much expertise 
to address the problem.322 A new architecture would create the 
risk of forum shopping. Climate governance would become even 
more fragmented than it already is. Activities and mandates 
would overlap, which might create unnecessary redundancies. 
Tensions would arise as would inconsistencies and potential 
undermining of one framework by the other; not desirable in 
periods of already scarce resources and time. A certain amount 
of competition is healthy in most contexts, but not when there is 
a risk that attention will focus on the institutional players and 
processes instead of the underlying problem, as could happen if 
another climate platform were created. In reality, attempts to 
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steer action away from the UNFCCC have not succeeded in 
gaining sufficient political weight to shape the climate agenda.323 
There is consensus among most, if not all, governments that the 
appropriate venue for developing the post-2012 climate 
framework is the UNFCCC.324 Governments are willing to invest 
political capital and resources to defend the UNFCCC climate 
regime against attempts to sideline it.325 After Copenhagen, this 
willingness probably decreased somewhat, but it has gained 
momentum again. Quite simply, the “UNFCCC is the only body 
that can deliver a comprehensive, legally binding international 
treaty.”326 Much indicates that the UNFCCC is, again, if not the 
only, then certainly the most relevant game in town. 
B. Complementary Forums 
Diverse negotiating platforms within an overall architecture 
are beneficial to treaty drafting processes in general. In 
connection with the Montreal Protocol, for example, the parties 
took advantage of differing forums and working groups as a 
complement to, but not a replacement of, the main forums.327 
“The use of small, private negotiating platforms in the 
beginning stages of negotiations was conducive to negotiations 
on issues that sharply divided coalitions.”328 
Alternative negotiation settings outside the UNFCCC 
umbrella can, as a complement to the UNFCCC, also help move 
issues to a higher political level and allows parties to explore 
contentious issues without the pressure of needing to advocate 
rigid diplomatic positions.329 Further, they provide an arena for 
less formal interaction between large emitters that often have 
diametrically opposed positions.330 “Fortunately, it no longer 
appears that any of the major international forums addressing 
climate mitigation are directly counteracting each other.”331 For 
                                                                                                               
323.  Id. at 134. 
324.  Bodansky, supra note 203, at 2. 
325.  Bausch & Mehling, supra note 20, at 134. 
326.  Eckersley, supra note 147, at 40. 
327.  O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 13. 
328.  Id. 
329.  Bausch & Mehling, supra note 20, at 134. 
330.  Id. 
331.  Id. at 133. 
2014] THE "MAGIC NUMBER" IS THREE 443 
completeness, the rest of this Article thus examines the major 
international forums that could supply alternative climate 
negotiation opportunities. 
1. The UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly 
Climate change has long been recognized to have serious 
security implications. There is a clear nexus to the work of the 
UN Security Council. A solution by the Security Council itself or 
even the creation of a new “Climate Council”332 as a subsidiary 
organ have been suggested, as has bringing climate change 
action into the authority sphere of the UN General Assembly. 
The above discussion of the general advantages and 
disadvantages of climate change work in non-UNFCCC forums is 
relevant here as well, but in particular, climate work 
negotiations and other action under the UN Security Council in 
particular might be taken more seriously by the world’s nations 
and thus help break the stalemate that has persisted in this area 
for more than twenty years. The Security Council has been 
trialed in regulating non-state actors already. It has more 
authority—real and perceived—than the UNFCCC. Some of this 
is obviously coercive by nature, but some recent progressive 
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter333 resembles law 
making rather than mere enforcement. For example, Resolution 
1373, a post 9/11 counterterrorism measure, called on all states 
to “adjust their national laws” so that they can ratify all existing 
international conventions on terrorism. Resolution 1540 covers 
the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(“WMDs”). It requires all member states to “develop and 
                                                                                                               
332.  See, e.g., Eckersley, supra note 147, at 19. Article 7 of the United Nations 
Charter allows for this: “Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be 
established in accordance with the present Charter.” U.N. Charter art. 7. 
333.  Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations governs “Action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” U.N. 
Charter ch. VII. Article 39 stipulates that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security” U.N. 
Charter art. 39 (emphasis added). Climate change has been recognized to carry with it 
an inherent threat to the peace in cases where, for example, large population segments 
seek to emigrate to unwilling host nations as water resources become more and more 
scarce or as land in the emigrants’ original host nations becomes unlivable or 
submerged. 
444 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:373 
enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures” against the 
proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
other WMDs, as well as their spread to non-state actors. 
Resolution 1308 relates to the impact of AIDS on peace and 
security. All three of these resolutions are binding on all 
members without their signature and backed by the possibility of 
coercive sanctions. In other words, they are examples of 
veritable international institutional law-making without 
necessarily having to reach global consensus on a given issue. 
But all three govern existing, on-the-ground effects with current 
military implications, which is not yet perceived to be the case 
with climate change. Although “a small minority of writers 
believe that there are any legal limits to the discretion of the 
Security Council in identifying a threat to the peace . . . [most] 
share the view that the Council’s determination under [Article 
39 of Chapter VII] is essentially political”334 and unlikely to be 
immediately forthcoming in relation to climate change. In fact, 
the Council has “not to date shown any great alacrity in 
identifying environmental threats to the peace.”335 
Expecting the Security Council to act legislatively against 
climate change involves a “securitization issue,” in other words, 
“referring to an issue that has hitherto been conceptualized only 
in political, economic, environmental or other terms as a 
security threat so as to heighten awareness of the issue and the 
urgency of taking effective action.”336 For now, the Council is 
more likely to react in response to the consequences of climate 
change rather than addressing the substantive problem itself.337 
Thus, imminent “legislative” action by the Security Council is 
only a theoretical opportunity. And although, strictly seen, there 
are no legal limits to the Council’s mandates as long as they 
revolve around security implications, there are practical limits at 
issue. In this context, those are the political obstacles presented 
by members with veto powers potentially having to vote against 
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their own self-interest. As long as they have no interest in taking 
action against climate change, they are equally unlikely to do so 
under the Security Council as under the UNFCCC architectures. 
What has the Council itself said about climate change? In 
2007, the Council had its first debate on the issue. Focus was as 
much on the appropriate international forum within which to 
address the problem as on the substantive part of the problem 
itself.338 Discussions echoed the general North/South divide, 
and the G77 and China took a stance against the Security 
Council being the appropriate forum for climate change 
action.339 In a 2011 debate, the Council did not take a position 
on climate change, but did express concern that security issues 
would be implicated “in the long run.”340 The G77 and the non-
aligned movement remained averse to the idea. 341 
Just as the imminently needed action is unlikely to come 
from the Security Council, it is equally unlikely to stem from the 
General Assembly. In its first debate on climate change security 
in 2009, the General Assembly reaffirmed the UNFCCC as the 
key instrument for addressing climate change.342 
2. The WTO 
The nexus between climate change and the WTO is both 
contextual and financial in nature. As with the WTO, climate 
change involves issues of increasing international trade and 
development, both of which lead to rapidly increasing levels of 
GHG. Climate change has significant global trade and other 
cross-border economic implications such as national subsidies, 
border tax instruments, obligations to purchase emission 
permits, and other measures that may intersect with legally 
binding WTO rules.343 Both areas have come to need a 
supranational regulatory regime for orderliness and, in the case 
of climate change, even implications involving life and death. 
The trade regime creates welfare benefits to individual nations. 
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In contrast, the climate regime governs the global commons and 
increased global welfare, but individual nations taking unilateral 
action may suffer welfare losses.344 These must either be 
compensated for, or, alternatively, economic “welfare” benefits 
to acting nations should be established345 in order for 
sufficiently incentivize these nations. Thus, in climate 
negotiations, the short-term goals for acting nations are to 
maintain national welfare and mercantile interests whereas the 
end goal is to increase global welfare.346 
The legal authority of the WTO would be an advantage to 
the organization also addressing climate change, but significant 
hurdles present themselves in this context. First, the WTO 
currently has 159 members and is, as the UNFCCC, consensus-
based. Reducing the number of voting parties from 195 (in the 
case of the UNFCCC) to 159 is unlikely to make the necessary 
difference in reaching a substantively effective international 
agreement. 
Most importantly, the WTO’s main focus is trade issues, not 
climate change. This situation could, however, change. The 
rules that enable divergence from the WTO agreement rules 
(governing trade) are known as “exceptions.” Article XX of the 
GATT provides that “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of 
measures . . . necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, and . . . relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources.”347 There is thus apparent and “squarely applicable” 
authority for exceptions from the existing trade-focused rules. 
Nonetheless, Article XX authority has not led to any results of 
any relevance to climate action so far, and it is unlikely to do so 
within the next months and years before a new agreement 
simply has to be adopted to avoid catastrophic effects of climate 
change. 
Alternatively, GATT Article XXI provides that: 
Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to . . . prevent 
any member from taking any action which it considers 
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necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests . . . (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations; or . . . (c) to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.348 
Even though Article XXI appears alluringly relevant to 
climate change seen from an environmental advocacy point of 
view, application of the Article has been interpreted to require 
the specific purpose of preserving national security.349 
Application of Article XXI to climate change solutions is thus 
currently a stretch as climate change has not yet actually and 
demonstrably resulted in any national security implications. 
There have been no ultimate panel or Appellate Body decisions 
addressing this exception since the WTO was established in 
1995.350 In US-Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, the Panel simply 
concluded that it was not authorized to examine the reasons for 
justification under Article XXI and thus unable to determine if 
the measures in question were defensible.351 In other words, 
even though it could, the WTO is, in reality, disinclined to use 
its authority to address matters implicating the security of a 
nation state. The United States would likely also continue to 
resist this. For example, US officials declined participating in a 
WTO dispute with the European Union regarding the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act because the “panel lacked 
competence to adjudicate on a national security issue.”352 Thus, 
Article XXI is also unlikely to be applied presently, and 
presently is what is needed in the climate change arena. 
3. The G20 and OECD 
Scholarship also frequently raises the issue of whether 
climate change could more advantageously be addressed in 
smaller economic settings such as the G20 or the OECD. 
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Similar to the climate change problem, the 2008 financial 
crisis revealed the numerous and severe shortcomings of an 
existing regulatory system—in that case financial regulations. 
The crisis spurred international cooperation over these 
regulatory issues.353 The G20 stepped in and leaders provided 
much needed short-term crisis management,354 which is what is 
needed with climate change as well. Of course, regulations had 
to be implemented at the national level as the G20 cannot 
create any legally binding protocols and has few monitoring and 
enforcement tools.355 But the world became aware that rules had 
to be created, scrapped, or changed via G20 and other 
international attention. The need for similarly swift action by 
“champions,” as with the G20 leaders, is needed in the climate 
context too. 
The advantages of climate action spurred by the G20 
platform is that it is more flexible and able to act more swiftly 
than bigger architectures precisely because it creates no legally 
binding protocols. If the G20 could instigate action against 
climate change among its own members, this would be 
significant, as the G20 nations account for more than 80% of 
global GHG emissions.356 
But significant obstacles exist that make the G20 an 
unrealistic actor for change. Perhaps most importantly, precisely 
because the Group is not able to take legally binding action, it is 
unlikely to be much more than yet another forum for 
discussions. Legal action is needed, not more discussion forums. 
Further, strong opposition within the G20 to the Group 
addressing climate change comes from such formidable and 
numerous parties as China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, 
Argentina, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia.357 This may simply be 
insurmountable to action within the G20. Apart from the 
impetus for financial regulatory change after the 2008 crisis, the 
Group has displayed an unfortunate stagnation in the 
development of both climate change and economic policies.358 
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The G20 has come to suffer from a severe image problem. It is 
simply not considered significantly important by the 
international community359 and lacks ultimate, decisive 
leadership. In the words of Al Gore: 
Meetings of the G20 have become little more than a series 
of annual opportunities for the leaders of its component 
nations to issue joint press releases [wearing matching 
outfits] . . . . [This resembles] the parable of the child 
who notices that the emperor has no clothes. Except in this 
case, the clothes have no emperor.360 
If perception is reality, action is unlikely to come from the 
G20. Thus, efforts would arguably be better spent on addressing 
climate change within the UNFCCC, which is, as described 
above, seen globally to be a more appropriate forum for this. 
As for the OECD (which problematically does not include 
China and India among its members), the organization does 
recognize climate change as a key policy concern for the 21st 
century, but refers and defers to the UNFCCC for action361: 
“The objective of the work on long-term issues is to investigate 
how possible policy decisions, including future commitments, 
may progressively ensure the long term success of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.”362 
CONCLUSION 
Much climate change discourse centers on misconceptions 
of almost mythical proportions. This could prove detrimental in 
treaty negotiation contexts. As scholars, we must stop promoting 
rhetoric that has proved to lead to literally no substantive results 
in the climate change context. 
For example, one myth is that a solution to climate change 
is virtually impossible to reach at the supranational level because 
of the complex science involved and the contested political 
background among nations. In reality, nations have—as in the 
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case of the Antarctic Treaty System—been willing to give up 
positions that were thought to present insurmountable obstacles 
to an international legal solution at the time in question, even in 
times of a much more volatile political climate than now (such 
as the Cold War). As international environmental scholars, we 
often lament the fact that climate change is not ranked as highly 
on national agenda as arguably should be the case and worry 
that this means that no national and thus supranational solution 
can be found. It does not. Treaty history demonstrates that it is 
simply not a must that a given problem is ranked very highly on 
any national political agenda for a solution to still be found. 
Very frequently, scholars and policy-makers alike cite to national 
“moral obligations” and what nations “should” do, but 
sometimes largely ignore the perhaps ugly fact that money is 
typically the main concern, even in the climate negotiation 
context. Discussing risks and morality has led to virtually 
nothing so far. Monetary benefits must form a greater part of 
the rhetoric and solution. The Montreal Protocol, for example, 
presented a difficult technical and scientific background just 
like climate change does, but a solution was found because, 
among other factors, nations such as the United States realized 
the economic benefits to be reaped at the national level from an 
international solution. 
Another major line of thought holds that broadly accepted 
democratic methods have to be used in the climate negotiation 
context. This would, of course, be ideal, but reality shows that 
this too is not a must: some degree of coercion, secrecy, 
backroom deals, noninclusive voting processes, and small, 
exclusive clubs have been used—with success—in treaty contexts 
ranging from the Antarctic Treaty and Fur Seal Treaty processes 
decades ago to the Copenhagen COP 15 just a few years ago. 
Granted, it of course took more than just such methods, and 
some time, to create the needed breakthroughs, but these might 
very well not have been secured had parties not taken action 
that might, from an academic point of view, be frowned upon. 
Realism is different than idealism. Both play important roles in 
the development of the law, but with climate change, whatever 
may be able to break the current stalemate situation must be 
considered seriously because of the urgent nature of the 
underlying problem. 
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To be considered successful, a new climate treaty must 
likely be legally binding and include both developed and 
developing nations. All indicators show that the United States 
and China are crucial to a new solution. On the one hand, this 
appears troublesome because of the recalcitrant stance 
historically taken by both of these parties towards legally binding 
action at the national and international levels. However, the 
good news is that both have recently indicated at least some 
interest in both national and supranational-level action against 
climate change. Granted, a watershed may have to happen for 
these parties to ratify a new climate treaty, but with much recent 
focus on severe weather events, extreme pollution levels and the 
costs of climate change, one can hope that the Unites States and 
China will be willing to join a new treaty if the other 
considerations outlined above are also taken into account. 
One of the most prevalent myths is perhaps that all 195 
parties to the UNFCCC or at least “all” major emitters must 
form part of a new regime complex. Reality shows that focusing 
on smaller clubs in the beginning phases of treaty 
development—even just bilateral solutions to start with—can 
lead to much broader results. For example, even the European 
Union and WTO started with constellations much narrower 
than their current ones. What is needed is individual 
negotiation “champions” and nations that can promote the 
formation of such clubs in the newly restarted climate change 
treaty development context. These clubs could and likely would, 
as part of more progressive multilateralism, lead to the broader 
international solutions that so many call for. Currently, it makes 
little sense to continue hoping for very broad solutions, 
especially those that call for “all” major emitters, as these 
include highly recalcitrant nations such as India and Russia who 
still appear unlikely to adopt international solutions, especially 
in just another year or two. Whether democratically ideal or not, 
club formation is already well underway under the UNFCCC 
umbrella as shown by the Copenhagen COP 15 development. 
Even though not initially successful—in fact quite the 
opposite—the history of the Copenhagen Accord nonetheless 
shows how a related base agreement among just five initial 
nations can develop into a document adopted by more than 140 
nations just one year later. This additionally speaks to the 
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concern that there is no time for narrow solutions now: there is, 
in fact, no time not to take some action even if it is initially not as 
broad as should have been. The Montreal Protocol, European 
Union, Antarctic Treaty System, and Seal Treaty contexts 
analyzed above also broadened fairly rapidly. Legal pragmatism 
is, in this context, better than legal idealism. 
What, then, is the crucial number of nations that is likely to 
set action in motion that could, finally, have both a substantive 
and procedural effect? Although successful treaties have in some 
cases started with mere bilateral agreements, a climate deal is 
likely to require broader membership. As shown, the European 
Union is likely to join an agreement between the United States 
and China or other major developing nations. Recently, Brazil 
has appeared on the world stage as a potential and highly 
relevant candidate for a new treaty. Experts predict that if an 
agreement is reached between the United States, China, or 
another developing nation, other “holdouts” will join. Thus, the 
answer to how many nations currently constitute the “critical 
mass” needed in the climate negotiation arena is three. Such an 
agreement is most likely to be reached under UNFCCC auspices. 
However, the UNFCCC framework currently calls for consensus 
by almost 200 member states, a virtually impossibly large 
platform for agreement on the issue as long as it remains as 
narrowly formulated as it has so far. Accordingly, the consensus 
to be reached by the parties under that regime must, instead, be 
focused on a solution that allows for a much more tiered and 
club-based approach as described above. Or perhaps ranks will 
have to be so completely broken that a separate Protocol for a 
handful of some nations with a separate Protocol for others is 
the only legally realistic solution in the very limited amount of 
time remaining before 2015. Although the UNFCCC remains 
the most competent architecture for addressing climate change 
in general, other complementary forums could take steps to egg 
along the process or, most realistically, provide additional 
forums for related technical, trade-related, or national security 
issues. 
The last successes of large-scale, international governance 
date back two decades to the adoption of the WTO and, 
incidentally, the UNFCCC itself. Since then, not much has been 
accomplished at a level including literally hundreds of nations. 
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Solutions that may not be seen as “perfect” may have to suffice 
when it comes to climate change to get at least some action 
underway as soon as possible. In other contexts of extreme 
moral and other importance, compromises have also been 
reached for the sake of obviously necessary progress. For 
example, in the words of Thaddeus Stevens, a fierce opponent 
of slavery and discrimination against African Americans, on the 
alteration of his original proposal for the 14th Amendment: 
Do you inquire why, holding these views and possessing 
some will of my own, I accept so imperfect a proposition? I 
answer, because I live among men and not among angels; 
among men as intelligent, as determined, and as 
independent as myself, who not agreeing with me, do not 
choose to yield their opinions to mine. Mutual concession, 
therefore, is our only resort, or mutual hostilities.363 
Let us hope that nations will avoid mutual hostilities in 
their upcoming climate change negotiations and instead reach 
workable solutions before it is too late to avoid truly catastrophic 
climate change. 
  
                                                                                                               
363.  THADDEUS STEVENS SOCIETY, http://www.thaddeusstevenssociety.com/
Quotes.html (last visited March 8, 2014). 
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